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INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 1997, it seemed that the world paused, if only
for a moment, to reflect upon the future of the human species. The
announcement by Scottish scientists, Ian Wilmut and Keith
Campbell, that they had orchestrated the birth of Dolly the sheep,
the world’s first cloned mammal, ignited a worldwide debate about
1
the glory and tragedy of science. For many, Dolly was a shocking
symbol of biotechnology raging out of control, warranting a swift and
decisive halting of any further experimentation in the cloning arena
before its inevitable spillover to the human race. For a smaller group,
Dolly was a marvelous and long-awaited sign that a century-old
inquiry into the possibility of asexual reproduction had yielded a
tentative answer. For both groups, and for the myriad whose views
fall somewhere in between, the past six years have supplied sufficient
fuel to ensure that the cloning fires will burn long into the future.
In the six years since the announcement of Dolly’s birth, we have
undertaken to grasp some of the scientific methods associated with
cloning. Importantly, many now understand that cloning is not a
single technique, but rather refers to ways in which the genome of an
2
organism can be replicated. According to the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, the following three techniques are currently
referred to as cloning: 1) reproductive cloning; 2) therapeutic
3
cloning; and 3) embryonic cloning.
Each of these techniques
involves numerous scientific steps and raises both unique and
overlapping concerns. A brief description of each type of cloning is
warranted.
Reproductive cloning involves somatic cell nuclear transfer
4
(SCNT). Using SCNT, the nucleus is removed from an unfertilized
oocyte and replaced by the nucleus of a somatic (non-sex) cell of the
5
organism to be cloned. An electrical pulse is then applied to the
oocyte to activate it, much the way a sperm activates an egg by
1

See Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian
Cells, 385 NATURE 810 (1997). On February 14, 2003, nearly six years to the date of
their groundbreaking birth announcement, scientists at the Roslin Institute
announced that Dolly had died. Reports reveal that she was euthanized after
veterinary examinations showed she had a progressive lung disease. See Dolly the First
Cloned Animal Destroyed At Scots Institute, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 14, 2003.
2
See Michael R. Soules, The President’s Message: Cloning, 35:1 ASRM NEWS 3
(2001).
3
Michael R. Soules, The President’s Message: Cloning, 35:1 ASRM NEWS 3 (2001).
4
See George E. Seidel, Jr., Cloning Mammals: Methods, Applications, and
Characteristics of Cloned Animals, in Human Cloning 28-31 (Barbara MacKinnon ed.,
2000).
5
Id.
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penetrating its surface in the course of natural fertilization.
Thereafter, the oocyte develops into an embryo that can be
6
implanted into the uterus of a gestational carrier. A developing
embryo is generally transplanted back to the uterus when it reaches
the four-to-eight cell stage, which is approximately two days after
7
fertilization. Reproductive cloning differs from natural, or sexual,
reproduction in that the offspring have the identical genome as the
cell donor, rather than a mixture of two genomes from the male and
female gamete providers. Dolly is the product of reproductive
cloning.
Therapeutic cloning begins with the same steps as SCNT but
stops short of implanting the derived embryo into a gestational
8
carrier. Instead, the embryo is grown to the blastocyst stage, which is
9
beyond the point where it would be implanted into the uterus. A
10
It is
blastocyst is an embryo at about six days of development.
composed of an inner cell mass and a trophectoderm, which is an
11
outer layer of cells destined to become part of the placenta. The
cells from the inner cell mass have the potential to form any cell type
12
of the body and are commonly referred to as embryonic stem cells.
Therapeutic cloning involves removing cells from the intercellular
mass and developing compatible stem cells for the organism that
13
provided the nucleus.
A potential application of therapeutic
cloning may be the development of tissue for transplantation. If
embryonic stem cells can be made to differentiate into liver, nerve,
pancreas, or other human cells, such tissue would likely not be
rejected by the immune system of the person who supplied the
14
Therapeutic cloning may hold the promise of
nuclear DNA.
treating many life-threatening diseases and injuries, but it remains
controversial because it requires the destruction of a human embryo.
Embryonic cloning begins with an embryo formed in the
“traditional” way, that is by a single sperm penetrating a single oocyte.
6

See Seidel, supra note 4, at 28-31 (Barbara MacKinnon ed., 2000).
See R. R. Saith & I. L. Sargent, Embryo Selection for Transfer in Human In Vitro
Fertilization, 5 ASSIST. REP. REV. 145 (1995). Presumably an embryo created through
cloning would likewise be transferred to the uterus at the same early stage of
development.
8
James A. Thomson, Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC
STEM CELL DEBATE 15-16 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 17.
13
Soules, supra note 2, at 3.
14
Seidel, supra note 4, at 33-35.
7
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The cells or blastomeres of the early embryo are then separated and
the nucleus from each of these blastomeres is placed in an
15
enucleated oocyte which then becomes an embryo. Embryo cloning
thus produces a finite number of identical offspring, each having the
16
Unlike reproductive or
same genome as the original embryo.
therapeutic cloning, embryonic cloning does not involve replicating
an existing organism, but rather creates multiple offspring from the
donors’ combined DNA. Embryo cloning can be used, for example,
if a couple has limited gametes and wants to maximize their chance
for a successful pregnancy by creating multiple embryos.
Each form of cloning has evoked spirited and often negative
reaction. Opponents of reproductive cloning warn of “playing God,”
threatening the individuality of the cloned person, depriving a
cloned child the right to an open future, advancing eugenics by
creating super- and sub-human beings, and eroding family relations
17
by creating chaos in the natural ordering of generations.
Therapeutic cloning, like the ongoing debate over the use of human
embryonic stem cells for research purposes, invites discussion about
the intentional destruction of human embryos. Many feel it is simply
wrong to create an embryo for the purpose of destroying it, even if
such destruction could produce a good in the form of a cure for
disease. Finally, embryo cloning may be viewed as an unnatural and
unnecessary manipulation of the human embryo, an intervention
that shows disrespect for the integrity of this early form of human life.
In the course of public debate, the differences between the
various types of cloning seem to fade; what appears instead are
generalized reactions to the concept of cloning as it is popularly
18
understood, primarily as a means of reproduction. The initial and
15

Id. at 24-28.
Id. at 24-27.
17
See Bonnie Steinbock, Cloning Human Beings: Sorting Through the Ethical Issues, in
HUMAN CLONING, supra note 4, at 68-84 (containing a review and refutation of the
major ethical arguments that have been made against human reproductive cloning);
see also Lori B. Andrews, Is There A Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L & TECH. 643, 649-57 (1998) (setting out the potential
physical risks, and the psychological and societal impact of cloning humans).
18
Perhaps this is best demonstrated by the passage of H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (
2001), which bans all forms of cloning. Specifically, the bill provides that “[i]t shall
be unlawful for any person or entity, public or private, in or affecting interstate
commerce, knowingly (1) to perform or attempt to perform human cloning . . . .”
H.R. 2505, at § 302(a). The bill later prohibits the development of human embryos
through cloning, thus effectively banning therapeutic cloning. Id. at § 302(d). At
the time of the House debate, the concept of therapeutic cloning was only beginning
to garner public attention. Today it is a more visible issue, due in part to President
Bush’s announcement in August 2001 about the use of federal funds for human
16
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continued reaction to reproductive cloning is generally negative, as
evidenced by the existing and contemplated bans on the scientific
19
process. To date, seven states have enacted reproductive cloning
20
bans, while similar legislation is pending in a majority of American
21
states. Cloning continues to dominate the national political scene as
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives wrestle over
the future of reproduction and recuperation using this emerging, yet
unnerving, technology. The only consensus our national leaders
seem to have reached is that while the merits of therapeutic cloning
remain debatable, the practice of reproductive cloning is morally and
22
scientifically unacceptable and should be prohibited.
This Article addresses the worthiness of a ban on human cloning
and focuses specifically on the following question: Is a ban on human
reproductive cloning moral, legal, or practical? Part I explores the
initial and continuing public and political reactions to the concept of
cloning as a means of producing children. Because these reactions
continue to dominate our emerging legal response to cloning, a
review of public sentiment is an integral element in an analysis of
cloning law. Interestingly, if one tracks the opinions of public policy
makers, as well as members of the general public, it appears that little
has changed since Dolly’s birth in February 1997 when the possibility
of cloning moved closer to a reality—cloning remains a highly
unpopular prospect, thus driving the move toward state, national,
23
and international bans of the practice. Part I posits that cloning
resembles other reproductive technologies whose introduction
sparked tremendous fear, but whose usefulness ultimately quelled the
trepidation accompanying them.
Next, Part II queries whether there is any moral, legal, or
practical justification for a ban on cloning. Part II.A. analyzes the
embryonic stem cell research, a technique similar to therapeutic cloning. See, e.g.,
Carol M. Ostrom, Stem-Cell Research Shows Promise, But Techniques Intertwine with
Cloning, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 29, 2001.
19
See infra notes 31-34.
20
See infra notes 192-98.
21
See infra note 41.
22
See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Human Cloning Ban Sidetracked; Senate Vote Deals
Amendment Second Setback in a Week, WASH. POST, June 19, 2002, at A4 (reporting
remarks of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle that a bill to allow cloning for
research while banning it to produce babies has the support of a majority of
senators).
23
See infra notes 41 & 191-97. An international Convention of the Preservation of
the Human Species that would outlaw all efforts to initiate a pregnancy by using
human cloning is suggested in George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered
Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28
AM. J.L. & MED. 151 (2002).
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moral justifications for cloning bans under two well-established
branches of moral philosophy: utilitarianism and deontology. Using
the framework of these often conflicting approaches, Part II.A. also
explores the rightness and wrongness of human cloning and its
prohibition. Ultimately, both philosophies reasonably yield the
conclusion that a ban on human cloning cannot be morally justified.
If cloning proves to be a safe and effective method of human
reproduction, a utilitarian calculus would favor the balance of
benefits that cloning could achieve, while a deontologist may find a
moral obligation to advance our understanding of the creation of
human life.
Part II.B. looks at the legal justifications for cloning bans and
specifically raises two potential constitutional challenges to such bans.
First, this Part focuses on the assertion that human cloning bans
violate protected procreational autonomy by denying individuals the
right to choose this unique method of reproduction. Assuming
human cloning proves to be a safe and effective technique, it would
be considered a viable form of reproduction. Any governmental
prohibition on the use of cloning technologies, therefore, would be a
substantial infringement of a protected constitutional right.
Moreover, Part II.B. argues that current cloning bans are
unconstitutionally vague and thus violate the due process rights of
patients, scientists, and researchers alike.
Finally, Part II.C. considers the practical aspects of banning
human cloning. Advances in animal cloning research already
portend the inevitable spillover to the human population, a spillover
that is only fueled by the companion interest in developing profitable
therapeutics using cloned embryonic stem cells. In addition,
ongoing efforts to clone the first human being are well-documented
and proceed despite overwhelming opposition to reproduction
through cloning. Thus, current scientific advances in cloning let the
“genie out of the bottle” and, practically speaking, no law will abate
the modern world’s interest in the cloning phenomenon.
Acknowledging this reality, we must turn our attention away from
whether cloning bans are justifiable and focus instead on what effect
cloning will have on our society. The search for answers may also
help us understand whether we should view cloning as an
incremental step in a continuum of assisted reproductive advances or
a transgression of nature that will doom the human species.
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I. GAGING THE RESPONSE TO HUMAN CLONING
A. Initial Reactions and Actions
In the days and months following the announcement of Dolly’s
birth, the federal government acted with uncharacteristic speed to
assure the public that human cloning would not become a reality in
the near future. On March 4, 1997, a mere ten days after Dr. Wilmut
made worldwide headlines, President Clinton issued an Executive
Order banning the use of federal funding for human cloning
24
research.
At the same time, the President asked his previously
assembled bioethics council, the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC), to review the legal and ethical issues associated
with cloning and to report back to him in ninety days with
25
recommendations on possible federal actions to prevent its abuse.
In June 1997, the NBAC responded to the President’s request and
issued a report recommending a temporary moratorium on all
26
clinical and research efforts to clone a human being.
The NBAC Report is, by its own admission, a compromise
position grounded in the issue of safety, the only area of common
agreement among the diverse group of participants. The NBAC
agreed that cloning is “not safe to use on humans at this time,” and
therefore is “likely to involve unacceptable risks to the fetus and/or
27
potential child.” This consensus on safety, coupled with the public’s
perceived clamoring for protection from science gone awry, would
have seemed sufficient to mobilize Congress into passing a total ban
on human cloning. In fact, to date no such ban has passed both
28
Houses of Congress, despite the introduction of numerous bills.
24

Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of Human
Beings, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997). At the same time, President
Clinton urged the American scientific community to voluntarily refrain from
pursuing research in human cloning, at least until such time as a federal advisory
commission could study the issue. Id.
25
Letter from William J. Clinton, President of the United States, to Harold
Shapiro, Chair, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Feb. 24, 1997, reprinted in
Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (1997) (hereinafter NBAC Report).
26
NBAC Report, supra note 25, at iii-iv (Executive Summary). NBAC also
recommended a “continuation of the current moratorium on the use of federal
funding in support of any attempt to create a child by somatic cell nuclear transfer.”
Id. at iii.
27
Id. at 108.
28
See, e.g., H.R. 923, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1611, 105TH Cong. (1998); S. 1602,
105th Cong. (1998); S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998). On July 31, 2001 H.R. 2505 passed
the House by a vote of 265-162. The bill, and other anti-cloning measures, are
currently being considered by the Senate. See infra note 40. For a discussion of
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One might surmise that some legislators worried as early as 1997 that
a total ban would also halt valuable research using therapeutic
cloning, or that a ban on reproductive cloning could be interpreted
as an infringement on women’s reproductive autonomy. Perhaps the
29
lack of action is simply the product of ordinary political gridlock.
State legislatures proved far more anxious to outlaw human
cloning, as several states enacted cloning bans in the aftermath of
30
Dolly’s birth.
California became the first state to ban human
cloning by statute, placing a “five-year moratorium on the cloning of
an entire human being in order to evaluate the profound medical,
31
ethical, and social implications that such a possibility raises.” The
California moratorium was originally set to expire on January 1, 2003,
but a new law was enacted in September 2002, instituting a
32
permanent ban on human cloning for reproductive purposes. In
addition to legislative action in the United States, numerous other
33
countries enacted cloning bans, including twenty European nations.
The many efforts to ban the technique of human cloning were
not surprising given the intense and nearly universal condemnation
of the prospect of human somatic cell nuclear transfer. In a February
24, 1997 Gallup Poll, just one day after Dr. Wilmut’s stunning
announcement, adults in the United States were asked, “Do you think
that human cloning is a good thing or a bad thing?” The results were
overwhelming. Eighty-eight percent said cloning was a bad thing,
with only six percent finding it a good thing. Similar results were
legislative efforts to ban human cloning, see Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional
Implications of Human Cloning, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 649 (2000).
29
The reasons for congressional inaction on human cloning are far clearer today
than they were in the early stages of the debate. In the past year alone, awareness of
the use and promise of therapeutic cloning has grown dramatically, due in part to
President Bush’s August 2001 announcement on federal funding for stem cell
research, a related technique that harvests cells from an early embryo. See supra
notes 8-14 and accompanying text. By all accounts, the Senate has failed to pass
cloning legislation because its members are divided over whether to ban all forms of
cloning, or to allow therapeutic cloning but prohibit cloning to produce children.
See Dewar, supra note 22, at A4.
30
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (Deering 1997); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.36.3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2 (1998); S. 864, 89th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997).
31
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185(1) (Deering 1997).
32
See S. 1230, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (California Senate bill extending the
operation of the anti-cloning legislation indefinitely, signed into law by Governor
Davis on September 22, 2002).
33
See Foley, supra note 28, at 649 n.20 (stating that “Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldovia, Norway, Portugal,
Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey have banned human
closing”).
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obtained when the question was framed in terms of morality. The
numbers were identical in response to the question, “Do you think
that human cloning would be morally acceptable or would it be
morally wrong?” A full eighty-eight percent said cloning would be
morally wrong, and only six percent answered that it would be
34
morally acceptable.
Clearly, the initial reactions to the prospect of human cloning
were overwhelmingly negative. Editorial pages across the world were
replete with dire predictions should the technique make its way into
35
human reproductive circles. Even Dr. Wilmut, the Scottish scientist
who had produced Dolly, labeled the possibility of human cloning
36
“ethically unacceptable,” though he confessed that there was “no
37
reason in principle why you couldn’t do it.”
With such a
tremendous consensus on the evils of human cloning, it seemed
likely that worldwide efforts to thwart its development would be swift
and decisive. But, as in many other arenas, accord does not
necessarily translate into action. Though initial reactions were
emotional and emboldening, political developments affecting
cloning have been fairly sparse, perhaps due in part to the lack of any
significant breakthroughs in the field of human cloning. As the
twenty-first century dawned, however, the sleeping giant—cloning—
began to wake.
B. Recent Attitudes Toward Human Cloning
In the six years since Dolly’s birth, opposition to human cloning
has remained the same. In a November 2001 Gallup Poll, once again
eighty-eight percent of respondents said they oppose “cloning that is
designed specifically to result in the birth of a human being,” while
38
only nine percent approved of such activity. Congress continues to
debate the cloning issue, buoyed by passage of two House Measures
on July 31, 2001 and February 27, 2003, banning all varieties of
34

Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online (February
24, 1997).
35
See, e.g., James D. Davis, Cloning News Raises Words of Caution, SUN-SENTINEL,
Feb. 27, 1997, at A1; Philip Terzian, Send in the Clones, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 26,
1997, at B7; Nigel Hawkes, Legal Barriers Will Prevent Apocalypse Now, If Not Later, THE
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997; Cloning for Good or Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at A26; Carol
McGraw & Susan Kelleher, Can Cloning Also Give Life to a Soul?, ORANGE COUNT. REG.,
Feb. 25, 1997, at A1; Richard Saltus, Created Genetically Equal; Cloning of Adult Mammal
Breaks the Scientific Mold, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 1997, at A1.
36
See Wilmut et al., supra note 1.
37
See Daniel Callahan, A Step Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at A23.
38
Reported by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No.
2., vol. 13., at 60 (Mar. 1, 2002).
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human cloning, including reproductive and therapeutic forms.
Several bills are currently pending in the Senate, each seeking to ban
reproductive cloning, but differing on an additional ban on
40
therapeutic cloning. At the state level, a majority of jurisdictions are
41
currently considering anti-cloning measures, and seven states have
39

H.R. 2505, 107th Cong., (2001) passed the House of Representatives by a vote
of 265-162. The House bill imposes criminal penalties on any person or entity that
performs or attempts to perform human cloning. The bill defines human cloning as
“human asexual reproduction, accomplished by introducing nuclear material from
one of more human somatic cells into a fertilized or unfertilized oocyte whose
nuclear material has been removed or inactivated so as to produce a living organism
(at any stage of development) that is genetically virtually identical to an existing or
previously existing human organism.” H.R. 2505, at § 301(1). The reference to a
ban on producing “a living organism at any stage of development” would apply to
research or therapeutic cloning which involves producing an early stage embryo
from which stem cells are derived. H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003), passed the House
of Representatives by a vote of 241-155. It likewise criminalizes human cloning.
40
See S. 2439, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2076, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1899, 107th
Cong. (2002); S. 1893, 107th Cong. (2002). In addition to the bills pending in the
Senate, several bills were introduced over several years in the House of
Representatives. See, e.g., H.R. 3495, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1758, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 214, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2608, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2505,
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2172, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 790, 107th Cong. (2001);
H.R. 1608, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1644, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 704, 107th Cong.
(2001); S. 1372, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1260, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2326, 106th
Cong. (1999); S. 571, 106th Cong. (1999).
41
See H.R. 218, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002); H.R. 2108, 45th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2002); Jt. Res. 38, 2001-01 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); S. 1557, 2001-02 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2002); S. 1230, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); H.R. 1073, 63rd Gen. Assemb.,
2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002); S. 344, 141st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Yr. (Del. 2002); S. 329,
141st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Yr. (Del. 2002); S. 1164, 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2002); H.R.
805, 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla., 2002); H.R. Res. 1612, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2002); S. Res. 864, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002); H.R. 3693, 92nd
Gen. Assemb., 2001-02 Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2001); S. 493, 92nd Gen. Assemb., 2001-02
Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2002); S. 138, 112th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2001); S.
2118, 79th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Sess. (Iowa 2002); H.R. 2736, 79th Legis., 2002 Reg.
Sess. (Kan. 2002); H.R. 138, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2002); H.R. Res. 458, 2002 Reg.
Sess. (Ky. 2001); S. 1809, 182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001); S. 1794,
182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001); S. 1673, 182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2000); S. 192, 182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2000); H.R. 354,
91st Legis., 2002 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2002); H.R. 361, 2002 Reg. Sess. of Miss. Legis.
(Miss. 2001); H.R. 1449, 91st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002); H.R. 1028,
91st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001); H.R. 947, 91st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2001); H.R. 718, 91st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001); H.R. 1067,
97th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2002); H.R. 1464, 2nd Year of the 157th Sess. of the
Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2002); H.R. 2040, 210th Legis. (N.J. 2002); H.R. 1379, 209th Legis.,
2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2002); S. 542, 209th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2002); H.R. 3978,
209th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2001); S. 7638, 225th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y.
2002); H.R. 9292, 224th Annual Legis. Sess (N.Y. 2001); H.R. 2905, 224th Annual
Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S. 1689, 224th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S. 1161,
224th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S. 670, 224th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001);
S. 1552, 48th Legis. 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2002); H.R. 2036, 48th Legis, 2nd Sess. (Okla.

2003

THE PROSPECT OF HUMAN CLONING

521
42

already enacted legislation banning human reproductive cloning.
Numerous blue-ribbon panels and professional organizations
have reported on cloning in recent years; these reports illustrate
general opposition to cloning, particularly reproductive cloning.
Prominent among these panels is the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS), which issued a tentative report in April 2002 addressing the
43
scientific and medical aspects of human reproductive cloning. In its
report, NAS recommends that “human reproductive cloning should
44
not now be practiced [because] [i]t is dangerous and likely to fail.”
The report further recommends that there be a legally enforceable
45
ban on the practice of human reproductive cloning.
The NAS
position is somewhat akin to that taken by President Clinton’s
National Bioethics Advisory Commission in suggesting that any ban
46
be reconsidered within five years.
Reconsideration, NAS argues,
should be based on new scientific and medical evidence
demonstrating that the cloning procedure is “likely to be safe and
effective” and “a broad national dialogue on the societal, religious,
and ethical issues suggests that a reconsideration of the ban is
47
warranted.”
Professional organizations have also responded hesitantly, and
sometimes negatively, to cloning. One professional organization that
might be viewed as friendly to human cloning is the American Society
15, 2002); H.R. 2142, 48th Legis., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2002); H.R. 2011, 48th Legis., 2nd
Sess. (Okla. 2002); H.R. 3897, 71st Legis. Assemb. (Or. 2001); H.R. 7145, 2001-02
Legis. Sess. (R.I. 2002); S. 820, 114th Sess. of the S.C. Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2001); H.R.
4408, 114th Sess. of the S.C. Gen. Assembly (S.C. 2001); S. Con. Res. 13, 77th Legis.
Assembly (S.C. 2002); S. 1209, 77th Legis. (Tex. 2001); S. 102, 77th Legis. (Tex.
2000); H.R. 2463, 2001 Sess. (Va. 2001); S. 1305, 2001 Sess. (Va. 2001); S. 379, 95th
Legis. Sess. (Wis. 2002); H.R. 699, 95th Legis. Sess. (Wis. 2002).
42
See infra notes 192-97.
43
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY, POLICY AND GLOBAL
AFFAIRS DIVISION, NAT. ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN
REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 6-6 (National Academy Press 2002) (unedited manuscript on
file with author) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN
REPRODUCTIVE CLONING].
44
Id.
45
The NAS panel also considered the scientific and medical aspects of
therapeutic cloning and concluded that “biomedical research using nuclear
transplantation to produce stem cells be permitted.” Thus, the panel approved
moving forward with therapeutic cloning efforts while supporting a total ban on
reproductive cloning, at least until the safety of the technique could be established.
Id. at 6-6 - 6-7.
46
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN
ETHICAL INQUIRY, Executive Summary (July 2002) [hereinafter HCHD REPORT]
(calling for a four year moratorium on human cloning).
47
SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING, supra note
43, at 6-6.
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for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), a voluntary organization of
fertility specialists founded in 1944. ASRM is a multidisciplinary
organization whose members include physicians and other health
48
care professionals practicing in the area of reproductive medicine.
Because many of its members could benefit professionally and
financially by offering cloning services, one might assume that ASRM
would favor minimal restrictions on the technique. Yet, in a
November 2000 report from its Ethics Committee, ASRM joined the
49
swell of anti-cloning sentiment. After discussing the possible ethical
arguments for and against reproductive cloning, the ASRM Ethics
Committee concluded that “[a]s long as the safety of reproductive
SCNT is uncertain, ethical issues have been insufficiently explored,
and infertile couples have alternatives for conception, the use of
reproductive SCNT by medical professionals does not meet standards
50
of ethical acceptability.” Thus, opposition to cloning continues to
predominate even among physicians and researchers who are most
knowledgeable about the science and potential benefits of this
emerging reproductive technology.
The most recent governmental condemnation of human cloning
can be found in the newly released report by the President’s Council
on Bioethics (“the Council”). Created by Executive Order on
51
November 28, 2001, the Council was charged with advising the
President on bioethical issues that “may emerge as a consequence of
52
advances in biomedical science and technology.”
The Council
chose human cloning as its first topic of inquiry, explaining that
“[t]he ethics of human cloning has been the subject of intense
discussion in the United States and throughout the world for more
than five years, and it remains the subject of heated debate in
53
Congress.” In July 2002, the Council issued a first report entitled
54
Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. The report
identifies five categories of concern regarding reproductive cloning
and ultimately concludes that “cloning-to-produce-children is not
only unsafe but also morally unacceptable, and ought not to be
48

Information about ASRM can be found at its website, http://www.asrm.org
(last visited July 18, 2002).
49
The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (Cloning), in 74 FERTILITY & STERILITY 873, 875
(2000).
50
Id.
51
Exec. Order No. 13237, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001).
52
Id. at § 2(a).
53
HCHD REPORT, supra note 46, at Preface.
54
See id.
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55

attempted.” The Council’s view on human reproductive cloning was
reported as unanimous, in contrast with its views on therapeutic
cloning, with some members favoring regulation and others calling
56
for a four-year moratorium on cloning for biomedical research.
What is interesting about these and other measures of public
opinion is that we are responding to the prospect of human cloning,
not to any existing use of the technology. The adage that “fear of the
unknown may be worse than the reality” has certainly dominated the
cloning debate.
Many commentators look to animal cloning
experiments and warn of potential safety concerns that could appear
in human attempts, while others conjure up worst case scenarios,
portending a “horde of Hitlers” populating our soil and wreaking
57
havoc on our civilized world. In every case, opinions about cloning
rest purely on how one views the future, a mortal impossibility by all
known accounts. Whatever the future of human cloning holds, it is
still in the future. The emergence of cloning as a new reproductive
technology marks a change from past introductions of newly
developed reproductive techniques.
In past years, we were
introduced to new assisted reproductive technologies such as artificial
insemination and in vitro fertilization from reports of their success in
humans. No media frenzy accompanied the early trials to study and
58
perfect these new methods of conception. When the technologies
were introduced, public reaction was initially negative, as it now is
with cloning, but grew increasingly positive as the safety and
59
effectiveness of the new technologies became apparent. Learning of
a technology’s promise before hearing of its prospect can have a
profound effect on the public’s perception of that technology. With
cloning, we have had a glimpse of the future and we do not like what
we see. Our current efforts to ban future cloning may be grounded
in our sincere desire to save the species from certain doom, but we

55

Id. at 6 (Executive Summary). The five categories of concern are: 1) problems
of identity and individuality; 2) concerns regarding manufacture; 3) the prospect of
a new eugenics; 4) troubled family relations; and 5) effects on society. Id. at 6-7.
56
Id. at 11-13; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush’s Bioethics Advisory Panel
Recommends a Moratorium, Not a Ban, On Cloning Research, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at
A21.
57
See Judith F. Daar, The Future of Human Cloning: Prescient Lessons from Medical
Ethics Past, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 168 n.7 (1998).
58
The early trials of human in vitro fertilization did garner some comment, but
by all objective standards did not rise to the level of public awareness surrounding
cloning. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical
Experiments on the Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174 (1971).
59
See Daar, supra note 57, at 169-79 (describing the early public reactions to
artificial insemination by donor and in vitro fertilization).
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must look carefully at whether our efforts can be justified.
II. CAN A BAN ON HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING BE JUSTIFIED?
Opposition to human cloning is grounded in many rationales.
The most widely held, and perhaps the only legitimate reason for
banning cloning, centers on concerns about safety and efficacy.
Dolly’s birth was widely reported to be the result of 277 failed
60
attempts, and animal studies continue to reveal pregnancy and
neonatal loss, as well as significant structural and functional ailments
61
among those animals who do survive birth. Though safety concerns
are speculative at this point because no attempts at human
62
reproductive cloning have been verified, these concerns do loom
large as we near the brink of the cloning barrier. Virtually all other
objections, be they moral, religious, social, or otherwise, seem to
contain the same core argument: that human cloning will change the
63
so-called natural order of life, for the worse.
What follows is a
discussion of the three primary bases underlying a potential ban on
cloning. All pose a simple question: Can a ban on cloning be
justified on moral, legal, or practical grounds?
A. Is a Ban on Human Cloning Moral?
The foray into questions of morality is fraught with controversy
60

See Wilmut et al., supra note 1, at 811.
See infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
62
On April 8, 2002, it was reported that Italian fertility specialist Severino
Antinori had succeeded in the first stages of human reproductive cloning. He
allegedly told reporters at a conference in the United Arab Emirates that a woman in
his research study was, at that time, eight weeks pregnant with a cloned embryo. See
First Human Clone ‘Is An Arab’, DAILY MAIL, Apr. 8, 2002, at 17. As of February 14,
2003, a group known as Clonaid has claimed to have cloned at least three babies
born somewhere outside the United States. The first child, a girl named Eve, was
claimed to have been born on December 26, 2002, to American parents. Two other
cloned babies were allegedly born to parents from Japan and the Netherlands. See
Amid Growing Scrutiny, Clonaid Says Third Cloned Baby Has Been Born, GENOMICS &
GENETICS WKLY., Feb. 14, 2003, at A16.
63
Examples of these arguments include fear that cloning will undermine human
individuality and dignity, encourage parents to treat their children as commodities
rather than as human beings, and destroy the integrity of families. See Steinbock,
supra note 17, at 68-84. Steinbock summarizes additional moral, ethical and social
concerns over cloning including the temptation to play God, the harm of depriving a
child of the right to an open future, the nefarious desire to create a sub-human
species to serve those of ordinary conception, the fear of eugenics, the deleterious
effect on family relations when a parent is both father/mother and sibling, and the
deprivation of having two genetic parents. Id. Of course, these arguments against
cloning implicitly assume that none of these harms exist under circumstances of
ordinary conception, a claim that can hardly be substantiated.
61
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even when the inquiries are simple and straightforward. The
morality of human cloning is, of course, hardly a simple matter. The
question of whether human reproductive cloning should be banned
has evoked tremendous conflicts among lawmakers, scientists, and
perhaps even individual families. Whether a ban on human cloning
is morally right or wrong is a seemingly simple query, but one that
evades an easy answer. The search for guidance on questions of
morality often leads to the realm of moral philosophy. Through the
thoughtfulness and eloquence of great thinkers of the past and
present, we can begin to formulate a more systematic approach to
determining the morality of a cloning ban.
As an initial inquiry, we must answer the question: what is moral
philosophy? Two authors who contemplated this question responded
that modern moral philosophy is the search for a rational mechanism
64
to resolve moral controversy.
Although somewhat circular, this
definition explains that moral philosophy is an attempt to develop
standards to evaluate, criticize, and ultimately categorize the
65
distinction between right and wrong conduct.
The term “moral
philosophy” is often used interchangeably with the term “ethics,”
which is defined as the study of standards of conduct and moral
66
judgment.
Contemporary moral philosophy is comprised of competing
theories, each advancing the supremacy of a distinct interest or
67
theme. There are numerous well-developed ethical theories,
however, the following two theories stand out as particularly useful in
evaluating the morality of a ban on human cloning: utilitarianism
and deontology. Briefly stated, utilitarianism is a consequence-based
theory, holding that actions are right or wrong according to the
64

JEFFRIE MURPHY
TO JURISPRUDENCE 73

& JULES COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
(1984). I have previously discussed the application of moral
philosophy to another bioethical dilemma, selective reduction of multiple
pregnancy. Some of the foundational discussion about moral philosophy derives
from that work. See Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy: Lifeboat
Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 823 (1992).
65
I derive this explanation of Murphy and Coleman’s definition of moral
philosophy, supra note 64, from C.E. HARRIS JR., APPLYING MORAL THEORIES 2 (1986).
66
HARRIS, supra note 65, at 2. Harris argues that moral philosophy is synonymous
with ethics because it involves a set of specifically elaborated principles of ethics. Id.
67
See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
44 (4th ed. 1994). In their groundbreaking work, Beauchamp and Childress
concentrate on several types of ethical theories, including utilitarianism, Kantianism,
character ethics, liberal individualism, communitarianism, the ethics of care,
casuistry, and common-morality accounts. While each of these theories could be
applied to the morality of a cloning ban, I have focused on the two theories that I
believe yield the most interesting contrast in analysis.
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balance of their good and bad consequences.
Deontology, in
69
contrast, assesses whether an action has independent moral weight.
Deontologists believe that features of an action other than, or in
70
addition to, consequences make that action right or wrong. These
somewhat competing ethical theories provide an interesting starting
point for assessing the morality of a ban on human cloning.
1. Banning Human Cloning: A View From Utilitarianism
The essential core of utilitarianism is the idea that human
actions and practices should be evaluated ultimately in terms of their
tendencies to advance the general welfare or social good. Put
another way, utilitarianism seeks to have human actions result in the
happiness or well-being of a majority of persons. It is often explained
by reference to the mantra, “‘The greatest happiness for the greatest
71
number.’” It advocates following the course of action that leads to
the best possible consequences. Thus, the ends are permitted to
justify the means. In the cloning context, utilitarianism would hold
that cloning should be permitted if it would maximize overall social
welfare, even if in the process it would be damaging to some
individuals.
To begin a utilitarian analysis, it is essential to marshal the good
and bad consequences that cloning might produce. It is important to
note, however, that any perceived benefits or harms are at this point
speculative, as we have not yet succeeded in cloning a human being.
The speculative nature of the consequences of cloning points out the
difficulty in assessing the moral rightness or wrongness of the
technique. Our application of utilitarianism, or any other moral
theory, relies on having some grounding in the action to be studied.
In the case of cloning, we must juxtapose the anticipated good
outcomes with the perceived bad consequences. Once the science of
cloning begins to emerge, we may find ourselves shifting the
72
utilitarian analysis to meet the realities of the technique.

68

Id. at 47.
Id. at 56-57.
70
Id. at 56.
71
See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 74 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM,
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789)).
72
In fact, utilitarians view themselves as responsive to changing social and
scientific conditions. They believe that actions should be evaluated in light of
existing social conditions, thus happiness is measured relative to prevailing social
norms. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 48-49.
69
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a. Possible Benefits of Reproductive Cloning
The ethics of utilitarianism could justify a ban on human cloning
if the balance of bad consequences outweighs the good
consequences. Much has been written about the potential good and
bad consequences that cloning portends, thus what follows is a brief
overview of the anticipated consequences of human SCNT.
Identifying the possible benefits of cloning is the first step. If
cloning proves a safe and effective method of reproduction, it could
aid couples and individuals in several ways. Couples who are
refractory to current infertility treatment would be able to have a
genetically related child through cloning. For example, couples in
73
which both the male and female lack gametes are unable to produce
a child without the aid of gamete donors. Cloning would allow such
a couple to experience the joys of parenting a child whose genes
derive from one member of the pair. In this capacity, cloning would
join a growing spectrum of assisted reproductive technologies that
currently aids tens of thousands of individuals in realizing their
74
dreams of parenthood.
Because of its complexity and likely
expense, it would serve as a last resort for most couples who desire to
parent a genetically-related child, but nevertheless it would likely
bring tremendous happiness to those couples who successfully avail
themselves of the technique.
In addition to aiding infertile couples, cloning could also be
used to avoid transmission of deleterious genetic traits to offspring.
In light of our growing familiarity with genetically-based disease
processes, we are increasingly aware that the key to maintaining our
health lies more in the past than it does in the future. The Human
Genome Project has revealed the genetic bases of many diseases and
is now beginning to pinpoint the exact location of genes thought to
75
be responsible for these ailments. If a couple is aware that one
73

This could occur, for example, if the woman lacked ovaries due to treatment
for a disease process, and the man lacked sperm due to radiation therapy to treat
testicular cancer. If the woman still had a uterus she could gestate the cloned
embryo and also experience the wonders of pregnancy.
74
In the year 1998 alone, assisted reproductive technologies were the means of
conception in the births of 29,128 children. The technologies include in vitro
fertilization and embryo transfer, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote
intrafallopian transfer. See Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States: 1998
Results Generated From The American Society for Reproductive Medicine/Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology Registry, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 18-19 (2002).
75
See Michael J. Smith, Population-Based Genetic Studies: Informed Consent and
Confidentiality, 18 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 57, 62 (2001) (reporting that “over
5,000 human disorders are known to have a genetic basis and over 1,000 of those
disorders have been mapped to specific regions of the genome”).

528

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:511

member is a carrier for a genetically-linked disease, cloning may be a
sure way to avoid passing that gene to the couple’s offspring. As with
infertility treatment, cloning may not necessarily be the first choice
for a couple in this position, as current technologies offer numerous
alternatives to prospective parents wishing to avoid deleterious gene
transmission. In addition to the use of donor gametes, couples can
use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to learn about the
76
health of their embryos before they are implanted into the uterus.
Using PGD, the couple can select for implantation only the
unaffected embryos in an effort to maximize the health of their child.
Cloning, however, may be more attractive to couples wishing to avoid
deleterious gene transmission because it does not involve the
deliberate destruction of affected embryos. In the end, cloning could
benefit those couples who wish to avoid passing on one partner’s
77
genome because of its health implications.
A third possible benefit of cloning would be to assist single
individuals and same sex couples in their efforts to reproduce. These
prospective parents may wish to procreate without the aid and
78
potential entanglement of gamete donors. For single individuals
and same sex couples wishing to parent a genetically-related child,
cloning offers benefits that are unmatched by current reproductive
technologies. For this group, the use of donor gametes may be
particularly unattractive because of its potential to raise parentage
issues. Lesbian couples that use artificial insemination by donor
(AID) risk sperm donors’ paternity claims once the child is born. In
some cases, courts uphold these claims, warning that AID donors
relinquish their parental rights only if the recipient woman follows a
79
statutory protocol surrounding the insemination. Single and gay
76

Y. Verlinsky et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: An Integral Part of Assisted
Reproduction, 17 J. ASSIST. REPROD. & GENETICS 75, 76 (2000).
77
Realistically we must bear in mind that the lack of known deleterious genes in
the unaffected partner does not mean that the individual lacks genes related to
disease processes. We are in the infancy stage of our knowledge of genes and their
relationship to health. The use of cloning or PGD to avoid transmission of certain
genes may still produce children who suffer from genetically-based illnesses and
syndromes.
78
Of course, in the case of males who wish to have a genetically related child
through cloning, a gestational carrier will be necessary to gestate the embryo to term.
But even for these males, the absence of an egg donor may be important to avoid
possible parental claims in the future.
79
See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986) (refusing to apply a
statute, providing that a sperm donor is treated in law as if he were not the natural
father of the child conceived, because a donor provided sperm directly to the
mother rather than to a licensed physician, as specified in statute); C.O. v. W.S., 639
N.E.2d 523 (1994) (holding that failure to comply with statutory medical
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men also face claims by egg donors and genetic surrogates whose link
to the child may also entitle them to parental rights. Cloning may
alleviate some of these worries by eliminating gamete donors from
the procreation equation.
Another beneficial use of cloning would be to aid parents who
have suffered the loss of a child. This use would require that parents
preserve some number of cells from their child, either before the
80
child dies or even shortly after death. Of course, the cloned child
would not be the same human being as the deceased child, but his or
her genetic similarity to the passed sibling may provide enormous
solace to the parents. In fact, reproductive cloning to respond to the
loss of a child has motivated couples to support underground cloning
81
efforts in the United States.
Clearly, these parents believe that
cloning would be a benefit to them. Critics wonder, however,
whether the cloned child, even if born healthy, would benefit from
82
conception in this manner and under these circumstances. Would
the parents harbor unrealistic expectations of the child that would
negatively impact that child’s life? Perhaps a utilitarian analysis
would weigh the parents’ happiness and the value attributable to the
child being born against the child’s unhappiness. If the overall
benefit is thought to outweigh the harms, an uncompromising
83
utilitarian would approve of cloning in this circumstance.
In summary, at least four groups could reap benefits from
reproductive cloning: infertile couples refractory to treatment with
requirements for artificial insemination prevents a mother from invoking the statute
to obtain dismissal of her sperm donor’s complaint to determine paternity, custody,
support, and visitation); cf. Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (holding a sperm donor was not a parent and had no parental rights or
responsibilities under a statute governing artificial insemination).
80
The idea of post-mortem reproductive cloning is no longer strictly a science
fiction idea. In 2001, scientists announced that they had successfully cloned a calf
from a cow that had been dead for 48 hours. Using a cooling method, the cow’s cells
were removed two days after death and then the nuclei were extracted and injected
into enucleated egg cells. See Rebecca McCarthy, UGA Clones Calf from Dead Animal,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 26, 2002, at 1A.
81
See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
82
Additional concerns surround the scenario where a child dies from an
inheritable disease and the parents choose to clone that child with the hope that new
treatments will be available for the later-born child. In this situation, parents are
purposefully causing the birth of a child who is highly likely to suffer during life and
experience a premature death. While one might question the competency or
compassion of parents who pursue this course of action, nothing in our current law
prevents parents with known genetic disease markers from conceiving children and
risking transmission to these offspring.
83
I borrow the term “uncompromising utilitarian” from BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 49.
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other assisted reproductive technologies; couples wishing to assure
avoidance of a deleterious genetic trait; single and same sex couples
who eschew the use of gamete donors, but who wish to have a child
that is genetically related to them; and parents who wish to clone a
deceased child. These individuals would argue that cloning is
uniquely capable of providing them the parenting opportunities they
seek. A ban on cloning would significantly harm these individuals
because there are no alternatives that fulfill their specific desires.
The overall utility of cloning, however, can only be evaluated by
weighing both benefits and harms. The next section explores some
of the counterbalancing perceived harms of reproductive cloning.
b. Possible Harms of Reproductive Cloning
When Dolly’s birth was first announced in 1997, the popular
press was replete with dire warnings about the evils of human
84
cloning. In the past six years, numerous scholars, commentators,
and policymakers have weighed in on the cloning debate, with the
vast majority counseling against the use of human reproductive
85
cloning. What follows is a modest attempt to highlight a few of the
many objections to this emerging reproductive technology.
First, and perhaps most importantly, there are tremendous
86
concerns over the safety and efficacy of human cloning. To date,
despite claims to the contrary we have seen no evidence of any
87
human being conceived through SCNT. As a result, we do not know
what that process would yield in the human reproductive setting.
Moreover, animal studies reveal that in some cases the cloned
offspring suffer from health problems related to structural and
88
functional abnormalities. While we do not yet know how the data
collected on animals will translate to the human population, at the
very least we know that the safety of human cloning is not assured.
Of course, the safety of reproduction in any form is never certain, but
at least with existing technologies we are familiar with the risk profiles
associated with each technique.
A second harm often cited is the threat cloning poses to the

84

See supra note 35.
See supra notes 17-57 and accompanying text.
86
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Visions: Biology: A Genetic Future Both Tantalizing and
Disturbing; A Small Leap to Designer Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at E7 (reporting a
retired Harvard Biology Professor’s concern that “the risk of creating deformed
babies is too great”).
87
See supra note 62.
88
See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
85
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89

individuality of the cloned child. The worry is that society would
view the child as a mere replica of the cell donor and, therefore,
undervalue the child’s unique selfhood.
Whatever talents or
idiosyncrasies attached to the donor would be expected of the child,
with no care paid to allowing the child to develop an individualized
personality. Parents might expect the child to make the same life
choices made by the cell donor and might mete out severe
90
repercussions if the child fails to satisfy these expectations. On a
grander scale, cloning might threaten the individuality of the human
race. If cloning becomes widespread, it would reduce the number of
unique genomes born in our world, creating classification of persons
according to the perceived worth of their genes. We would cease
valuing individuality and instead fixate on the predetermined genetic
destiny attached to the cloned person.
An oft-cited response to concerns about individuality is that a
clone would be born as an infant in a different familial setting and in
91
a different historical time frame. Unique circumstances and events
would shape the child’s life, as cloning certainly does not expose the
child to the formative environment of the cell donor. The child’s
future would be as open as any naturally conceived child, both of
whom may have parents who harbor great expectations for their
children. A parent’s expectations for his or her child would probably
not change in a cloning scenario, as expectations are often based on
the parent’s own accomplishments and failures. Whether those
accomplishments and failures derive from one genome or two would
not likely alter parents’ attitudes toward their children. Moreover,
concerns that the same genetic diseases plaguing the cell donor will
also affect the clone are not necessarily well-founded. Advances in
genetic diagnosis and gene therapy have progressed at a rapid pace
89

HCHD REPORT, supra note 46, at Executive Summary; see also Carolyn Wilson,
Statement in the Ad Hoc Committee on the International Convention Against the Reproductive
Cloning of Human Beings, February 26, 2002, 18 ISS. IN L. & MED. 187 (2000).
90
One author has labeled this phenomenon as depriving a child of “a right to an
open future.” See Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to An Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (W. Aiken & H.
LaFollette eds., 1980); see also Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to
an Open Future, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 549 (1997). This argument rests on a notion of
genetic determinism, that one’s genome determines one’s future. A child with a
duplicated genome would lack the opportunity to determine his or her own future,
or at the very least would be aware of the life choices and life struggles that afflicted
the cell donor. This knowledge alone would limit the “open future” for cloned
individuals who might be herded into the same life path followed by their
predecessors.
91
See Michael A. Goldman, Human Cloning: Science, Fact and Fiction, 8 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 103 (1998).
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in the past ten years and are predicted to accelerate with each passing
92
We have learned much about the genetic bases of certain
day.
diseases, such as coronary artery disease and hypertension, which are
diseases that are highly responsive to newly developed therapies and
studied lifestyle changes. Since many gene-linked diseases do not
develop until adulthood, a cloned child could reasonably assume that
a treatment for his or her particular disease would be available when
needed.
A third harm expressed about cloning is the threat of
93
commodification of children.
If and when cloning becomes
available for reproduction, it will likely enter the market at an
extraordinarily high price. The expenses surrounding human
cloning are already a topic of discussion, and these costs are out of
94
reach for the vast majority of prospective parents. For those few
wealthy individuals who do avail themselves of the emerging
technology, there is concern that they will treat their cloned children
as commodities, rather than as individual human beings, because
95
their births were orchestrated at an enormous financial cost.
Parents, it is argued, will expect a return on their investment much in
the way any investor seeks profit, and thus will be intolerant of any
perceived imperfection in their “product.”
It may be worth noting that similar concerns have been raised
over other reproductive scenarios.
These include surrogate
parenting arrangements in which a woman is paid to gestate another
couple’s embryo, and the creation of embryos using donor gametes
in which prospective parents pay for gametes that meet their
96
specifications. Both of these arrangements involve the expenditure
92

See U.S. Gene Therapy Markets, reported in MEDICINE & HEALTH’S BUSINESS ALERT
13 (2002) (predicting in a report released on February 11, 2002 that gene therapy
products will be introduced worldwide in 2004 and will generate approximately $125
million in annual revenues; these products include 134 genomic oncology drugs
currently in Phase II clinical trials and seven drugs in Phase III trials) (on file with
author).
93
E.D. Pellegrino, Balancing Science, Ethics, and Politics: Stem Cell Research, A
Paradigm Case, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 591, 609 (2002) (noting that “the
likelihood of extension of commodification to human cells is unfortunately high”).
94
See James A. Haught & Tara Tuckwiller, Cloning Effort Hidden in West Virginia
Town; Father Wanted to Duplicate Dead Son, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at A1
(reporting payment of $500,000 by a Charleston lawyer to a cloning group to clone
his dead son).
95
John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371,
1399 (1998).
96
The costs associated with these two scenarios are hardly accessible to the
average-salaried individual. The average fee paid to a gestational carrier is $10,000.
See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (describing a contract for
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of significant funds, as does the use of assisted reproductive
technologies in general. The average cost for a single treatment
using in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer is between $8,000 and
97
$10,500, as compared to the absence of expenses associated with
natural conception. Yet nearly two decades of experience with
collaborative and assisted reproduction, a process in which couples
often spend their life savings in pursuit of parenthood, have not
yielded a study showing that these parents regard their children as
commodities. In fact, psychological profiles conducted on the
children of assisted reproduction show they are no different from
98
their naturally conceived counterparts.
A final harm worthy of inclusion is the prediction that cloning
will advance eugenics in our society. Opponents postulate that
through cloning it will be possible to develop both super- and subhuman individuals to meet society’s needs, creating a class system
beyond any naturally occurring division among the people of the
world. The clear distinctions among individuals will lead us to revere
and shun certain genotypes, perhaps ultimately leading to the
99
enslavement or destruction of the lesser class. What is so very sad
about this Doomsday scenario is that history has proven that we do
not need cloning to practice eugenics in our society. The examples
abound, including the Holocaust in World War II Germany, ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, and the
implementation of forced sterilization statutes to weed out “mental
defectives” from American society in the 1920s. Justice Holmes’
words of seventy-five years ago still ring eerily from his opinion in
Buck v. Bell, when the Court upheld a Virginia statute allowing

gestational services calling for payment of $10,000 to the gestational carrier). In the
case of egg donors, there have been reports of couples willing to pay upward of
$100,000 to an egg donor who meets their highly specific criteria. See Martha FraseBlunt, Ova-Compensating?; Women Who Donate Eggs to Infertile Couples Earn a Reward B
But Pay a Price, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2001, at F1 (reporting on a half-page
advertisement in the Stanford Daily offering $100,000 for the eggs of a donor “with
proven college-level athletic ability”).
97
See Edward G. Hughes & Mita Giacomini, Funding In Vitro Fertilization Treatment
for Persistent Subfertility: The Pain and the Politics, 76 FERTILITY & STERILITY 431, 437
(2001).
98
See id. at 437 (reporting that no differences have been noted between IVF
offspring and the general population up to the age of thirteen years).
99
See George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED.
151, 153 (2002) (describing human cloning as a crime against humanity “by taking
human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a
new species, sometimes termed the posthuman”) (citing to FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR
POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002)).
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involuntary sterilization of mental defectives because “three
100
generations of imbeciles are enough.”
Sadly, ordinary conception has already produced men capable of
ferocious inhumanity unaided by any reproductive technology.
Cloning will likely not provide any greater opportunity for
101
manipulating our offspring than we currently enjoy.
Using
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, we can screen embryos for genetic
traits, either deleterious or benign, and select those traits we find
most desirable.
Moreover, the opportunities for collaborative
reproduction allow parents to choose the phenotypes and genotypes
that will combine to produce their child. Nothing in our current law
prevents parents from selecting egg and sperm donors of a particular
stature, intelligence, race, etc. in order to attempt to “engineer” their
children.
To date, we have seen parents using the option of donor
gametes in order to maximize the well-being of their children, with
most families selecting donors who resemble them in appearance and
102
family background.
The children of assisted reproductive
technology (ART), though they may have been engineered to some
103
extent, are welcomed by their parents as any newborn is welcomed.
There is no logical reason why a cloned child would not receive the
same treatment. Children of cloned conception will be born into the
world as any other child. Their parents’ instincts for nurturing will or
will not take hold, making these children no more or less likely than
any other children to experience the joys and sorrows of life.
The above discussion of the potential benefits and harms of
human reproductive cloning, along with some of the
100

274 U.S. 200 (1927). For a thorough discussion of the history of the American
branch of the international eugenics movement, see Paul A. Lombardo, “The
American Breed”: Nazi Eugenics and the Origins of the Pioneer Fund, 65 ALB. L. REV. 743
(2002).
101
An interesting twist that emerges from experiments surrounding animal
cloning is that cloned animals do not necessarily look like their genetic parent. In
the case of “cc” the cat, cloned by researchers at Texas A&M University in December
2001, the cloned animal had a totally different fur pattern from her genetic mother.
The reasons for this difference in phenotype can be explained by uterine influences
during gestation, including the position of the fetus in the womb. See Wes Allison,
How Many Lives Now?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at 1A. While we still do
not know whether findings in cloned animals will translate into humans, the
experience with “cc” reinforces the notion that cloning is not replication; each
individual animal takes on its own characteristics that make it a unique being.
102
See Frase-Blunt, supra note 96 (explaining that couples seeking egg donors “just
want to find someone like themselves”).
103
Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction, and the New State of
Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 504 n.119 (1996).
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counterarguments attendant to these assertions, is an essential
starting place for a utilitarian analysis. But a mere listing of utilities
and disutilities does not answer the question of whether cloning is a
morally correct act. In the case of cloning, balancing the benefits
and harms does not reveal a clear champion. Both sides have merit;
both demonstrate the happiness and angst that cloning can
engender. In addition to difficulties in discerning the morality of an
action when the benefits and harms appear to be in equipoise,
utilitarianism suffers other drawbacks as an ethical theory. Those
drawbacks are as applicable to cloning as to any other act where
ethics are in question.
c. Criticisms of Utilitarianism as a Moral Theory
All moral theories offer strengths and weaknesses in their ability
to assess the moral rightness of human actions. Perhaps the greatest
strength of utilitarianism is its apparent simplicity. Once the good
and bad consequences of an action are assessed, a utilitarian can
pronounce the action moral or immoral simply by balancing these
findings. Of course, making moral judgments is never easy, and this
simplistic description of utilitarianism reveals at least two problems
with the theory as a fully adequate measure of morality. Briefly
stated, utilitarianism has the potential to overstate benefits on the
one hand, while disregarding detriments on the other.
The problem with measuring the benefits of a certain action is
that the notion of benefit is highly imprecise. Utilitarians share the
conviction that human actions should be assessed morally in terms of
their production of maximal value, but they disagree over which
104
values are most important.
For some utilitarians, the value of
105
happiness should be the sole measure of utility, while others argue
106
that values other than happiness have intrinsic worth. Among these
107
other values are knowledge, health, and personal autonomy. In the
case of cloning, if happiness is the sole measure of utility, then the
104

BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 48.
The two most noted philosophers who hold this view are Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill, often referred to as “hedonistic utilitarians” because they conceive
utility entirely in terms of happiness and pleasure, two broad terms they treat as
synonymous. Id. (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11-14, 31, 34 (1970); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM
207, 210, 214, 234-35 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1969)).
106
Id.
107
Additional values include friendship, beauty, achievement and success,
understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relationships. Id. (citing G.E. MOORE,
PRINCIPIA ETHICA 90 (1903)); see also JAMES GRIFFEN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING,
MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 67 (1986).
105
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happiness of the parents derived from rearing a cloned child would
outweigh the difficulties experienced by the child because of physical
108
or psychological infirmities. The two parents’ happiness would also
likely outweigh any generalized concerns over the impact of cloning
on society, because individual happiness trumps speculative societal
harms.
In addition to imprecision in the measure of utility, an objection
to utilitarianism is the subjective nature of benefit. An individual can
express a preference that would be viewed as morally unacceptable
under prevailing social norms, yet that individual will derive
happiness by exercising that preference. Here, the theory of
utilitarianism must struggle with determining whether individual
preferences should be the measure of utility, or whether preferences
109
must fit within prevailing norms. For example, if a parent cloned a
child solely to serve as a solid organ donor for an ill sibling, we might
110
In our society, we
condemn that action and seek to prevent it.
value parents who embrace each of their children for his or her
individual self-worth. A parental preference that would involve
killing a child to save another should cause us to question the
soundness of a utility equation where three people are benefitted and
only one is harmed, when that harm involves unacceptable moral
(and legal) consequences.
As noted above, utilitarianism is problematic in its relative and
absolute assessment of benefit. Perhaps even more troubling,
however, is its dismissal of harm and tendency toward a tyranny of the
majority. Since the principles of utilitarianism dictate that the
interests of the majority are to override the rights of the minority, the
harms suffered by a few would be dismissed as unimportant in the
overall utilitarian calculus. In a cloning scenario, the harms may be
profoundly damaging to a few individuals, so much so that their
objections should not be disregarded. If cloning produces children
who are severely impaired and who suffer greatly during their
108

Some might argue that a cloned child derives happiness just from being born,
even if the child experiences suffering during his or her life. This happiness,
combined with the parents’ happiness at the opportunity to rear a cloned child,
could outweigh the unhappiness experienced collectively by the parents and the
child, deeming reproductive cloning a morally acceptable act when measured in
terms of happiness alone.
109
See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 53.
110
This scenario should be contrasted with one in which parents conceive a child
to aid an ailing child, but also intend to nurture that new child as an integral part of
their family. In these cases, the newly conceived child is subjected to minimal harm
and would presumably receive the same love and nurturing bestowed upon the ailing
child.
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shortened lifetimes, their conception could be morally justified using
utilitarian logic if their parents, and the physicians and researchers
who helped develop the technology for their birth, derive great
happiness from the accomplishment of creating a cloned human
being. In thinking about whether a ban on human cloning can be
morally justified, it is difficult to dismiss the potential harm to the
cloned individuals, even if the vast majority of those affected incur
111
tremendous benefit.
Conversely, if only a few members of society
fear the repercussions of cloning, and the vast majority, including the
cloned individuals themselves, are greatly benefited, overriding the
harms anticipated by those who are not directly affected by the
technology may be morally justified under utilitarian theory.
In the end, assessing the morality of a ban on human cloning is
difficult to accomplish using utilitarian principles because the science
has yet to reveal any actual benefits or harms to human beings. The
danger with proceeding to develop the science is, of course, that the
harms to cloned individuals will overwhelm any benefits. For this
reason alone, many have supported a total ban on human
112
reproductive cloning. But as noted in Part II.C., whether or not a
ban is enacted in the United States or abroad, cloning researchers
will continue to pursue the holy grail that human cloning has
become. Perhaps the better approach is to minimize the harms by
dedicating the most talented and highly organized scientific teams to
unravel the cloning mysteries, rather than allowing underground and
sporadic efforts to cause unnecessary pain and suffering.
2. Banning Human Cloning: A View From Deontology
The moral theory of deontology holds that the moral worth of
an individual’s action depends exclusively on the moral acceptability
113
of the rule on which that person acts. Thus, deontologists look not
to the consequences of an action, but rather to whether the act
conforms to an overriding moral duty. An act would be considered
morally right if it fulfilled a morally acceptable principle; an act
would be judged wrong by a deontologist if it violated a moral duty or
principle.
The deontological ethic is closely associated with
111

The following vivid illustration nicely describes the problem of the tyranny of
the majority in a utilitarian calculus: A healthy young patient goes to her physician
for a routine physical examination only to be killed for her organs so that five dying
patients can be saved. Utilitarianism would likely favor such action because one dead
is better than five dead. See Judith J. Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE
L.J. 1395, 1406-15 (1985).
112
See supra PART I.
113
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 57-58.
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Immanuel Kant and his moral rule or categorical imperative: “Act in
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as
115
an end.” Put in a more contemporary idiom, this imperative comes
to the following: “All rational persons have a right not to be used
116
without their consent even for the benefit of others.”
The
application of a deontological ethic to a ban on human cloning
requires defining the relevant rules and duties that could potentially
be advanced or violated by such a prohibition of conduct. A ban on
human cloning might be viewed as morally right because it fulfills a
duty that human beings have to avoid inflicting harm to others.
Since some of the early cloning studies conducted on animals showed
117
that some animals suffered life-threatening impairments,
a
deontologist might argue that attempting human cloning is immoral
because it may cause harm to cloned children, thus violating a moral
duty to maximize the well-being of our offspring. Under a different
set of scientific assumptions, however, human cloning could be seen
as morally acceptable. If cloning proves safe and effective, couples
who wish to avoid transmission of a deleterious genetic trait may be
fulfilling the moral duty of maximizing their child’s welfare by
utilizing the technique.
Deontology, like utilitarianism, fails to provide a full and
118
adequate theory of the moral life.
Criticisms of deontology focus
on the nature and hierarchy of the moral duties that are the
119
foundation of this moral theory. Two specific problems that seem
relevant to the cloning dilemma are the problem of conflicting
obligations and the fallacy of moral absolutism. Both of these
problems allow us to think deeper about the moral obligations we
believe should motivate human conduct, as well as the obligations
that actually do cause us to act.

114

Id. at 56.
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton
trans., 1964) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of autonomy, rights, and the
treatment of persons as ends in themselves in Kantian theory, see MURPHY &
COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 78-86.
116
MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 83.
117
Rosie Mestel, Dolly’s Death Resurrects Debate on Cloning Ethics, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2003, at A1 (noting that “[a] growing number of studies suggest that clones—even
the ones that make it to adulthood—may carry within them subtle genetic
abnormalities that could cause medical problems later in life”).
118
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 60.
119
Id. at 60-62.
115
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a. Deontology and the Problem of Conflicting Obligations
The problem of conflicting obligations arises when an individual
faces a choice of action that will result in the fulfillment of one moral
120
duty while another is violated.
Since deontology makes all moral
rules absolute, whatever course of action is taken will necessarily
involve violation of some moral duty. For example, if an only child
was involved in an automobile accident and suffered from kidney
failure as a result, the parents might make the decision to clone the
sick child to conceive and rear another child who could serve as a
kidney donor at an appropriate age. Here the parents would face two
competing obligations: the duty to maximize the well-being of their
child, and the duty to avoid treating any child as a means to an end.
The parents might argue that cloning would not violate the latter
duty in this case because the new child would be welcomed as a
blessed addition to the family. Similarly, the parents might argue
that not availing themselves of cloning violates their duty to care for
their ailing child.
A ban on cloning does raise interesting questions about the
moral obligations that surround human reproduction. We could find
cloning inherently immoral because parents would use cloning only
to satisfy their own selfish, narcissistic, and unreasonable desires.
Interestingly, the same claims can be made of ordinary reproduction,
yet a ban on traditional procreation hardly seems a popular idea.
Comparatively, we could find a ban on human cloning inherently
immoral because it deprives many individuals the opportunity to
reproduce in a manner that maximizes their well-being and thus
correspondingly maximizes the well-being of their children. If
protection of reproductive autonomy is a value worthy of moral
obligation, then banning cloning would violate our moral duty to
assure procreative freedom.
b. Deontology and the Problem of Moral Absolutism
A second criticism of deontology is its assumption about the
moral rightness and wrongness of human conduct. Deontologists
operate from the premise that there are moral absolutes in the world;
certain conduct is morally correct and other actions are morally
121
wrong.
But in our diverse and changing world, a system that
depends on moral absoluteness is destined for challenge. Who or
what is to be the arbiter of moral rightness? Actions that a large
120
121

Id. at 61.
Id. at 60-62.
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group might consider morally wrong an equally large group could
view as morally acceptable. A Gallup Poll conducted in March 2002 is
a chilling illustration that one person’s sin is another person’s
122
sanctity. The poll asked citizens of Kuwait, the country the United
States defended in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, if the September 11,
123
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center could be morally justified.
A full thirty-six percent responded that the perpetrators were morally
124
Though the survey was
justified in killing nearly 3000 individuals.
not conducted on U.S. citizens, it seems reasonable to assume that
few if any Americans would find moral justification for the September
11th attacks.
Clearly, morality is a complicated concept. One can assess the
morality of a ban on human reproductive cloning according to any of
the various ethical theories that comprise the field of moral
philosophy. No single theory is necessarily superior to another and
each could add a unique analysis to the moral evaluation of human
cloning. Thus far, we have considered the ethics of cloning from the
perspectives of utilitarianism and deontology. From the standpoint
of utility, a balance of the benefits and harms of human cloning does
not reveal a clear moral choice. To date, the benefits and harms are
largely unknown, thus the weighing of good and bad consequences is
purely a matter of speculation. If cloning proves a safe and effective
method of reproduction, however, then it seems likely that a
utilitarian would approve of the process for the benefits it could
provide to numerous individuals.
The benefits of aiding infertile couples, single and gay couples,
parents who wish to avoid passing a deleterious gene to a child, and
parents seeking solace for the death of a child would probably
outweigh the more speculative harms such as the effacement of
individuality, the commodification of children, and the advancement
of eugenics. These latter two harms have been previously raised in
the context of emerging reproductive technologies such as in vitro
fertilization, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and the use of donor
gametes, but there is no evidence that these harms have come to pass.
The argument that cloning threatens individuality must be assessed
under the presumption that each cloned child would be born in the
same manner as other children—following gestation by an intended
122

See Dave Moniz, Some Kuwaitis Dispute Anti-U.S. Results, USA TODAY, Mar. 5,
2002, at 11A (reporting on a February 2002 Gallup Poll in which thirty-six percent of
Kuwaitis found the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center “morally justified,”
while forty-one percent held an unfavorable opinion of the United States).
123
Id.
124
Id.
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mother or gestational carrier—and that the child would experience
the world in his or her own unique way. Different historical time
frames, different parents, different extended family, and even
different uterine environments assure that the cloned individual will
not lead the same life as the cell donor. At most, cloning provides a
glimpse into the future, but it is far from a magical crystal ball.
A moral assessment of a cloning ban from a deontological
perspective is challenging because of the competing and uncertain
moral obligations that surround both reproductive technologies and
the advancement of science. If it is moral to thwart research efforts
that could potentially benefit humankind because of legitimate safety
concerns, then deontologists would find human cloning morally
unacceptable, at least until safety could be assured and perhaps even
thereafter. But if mankind has a moral obligation to advance our
understanding of the creation of human life, then we can morally
pursue the safest methods of human cloning. Because each
individual brings his or her own moral compass to this debate, the
morality of a ban on human cloning is not readily apparent.
B. Is a Ban on Human Cloning Legal?
The groundswell of support for a ban on human reproductive
cloning proceeds seemingly unencumbered by concerns about the
legality of such a measure. Proponents of a cloning ban speak little,
if at all, about the legal or constitutional merits of forestalling
scientific inquiry into the workings of human SCNT. The popularity
of a ban on reproductive cloning assumes the mantle of legality, if for
no other reason than the popular outrage that would follow any
decision to the contrary. It may be the case that public support for a
ban on reproductive cloning is so strong that any legal challenge to
an enacted ban would be summarily dismissed, with no judge willing
125
to be perceived as dooming the human species.
While those in the political arena seem to have confidence in
the inevitable legality of cloning bans, other commentators have
questioned whether a total ban on this form of human reproduction

125

Needless to say, our judicial system is replete with judges who are fully willing
and capable of striking down even the most popular measures because they run afoul
of existing constitutional principles. Coincidentally, one such decision was handed
down as this article was being written. In Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th
Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a school district’s policy
requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and a statute inserting
the words “under God” into the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.

542

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:511

126

could pass constitutional muster.
The scholars who have weighed
in on the question are impressive in both their number and breadth
127
of knowledge in matters of reproductive jurisprudence.
For this
reason, this Part will attempt to marshal the prior commentary and
analysis on the legal aspects of a cloning ban, ultimately agreeing with
those who conclude that neutral application of constitutional
jurisprudence supports a finding that a total ban on reproductive
cloning is unconstitutional. At the same time, I confess a healthy
skepticism that any American court in the foreseeable future would
reach the same result.
Having set forth this prediction of discord between merit and
result, let us look briefly at two of the major arguments against
enforcement of a total ban on reproductive cloning. Please note that
other scholars have ably analyzed the legality of cloning bans, often
focusing on the several constitutional infirmities that these ever128
popular statutes display.
My aim is to present the two strongest
arguments against a total ban on human cloning. The challenges
discussed herein are as follows: 1) federal and state cloning bans
violate procreative liberty by depriving individuals of reproductive
choice, and 2) existing cloning bans are unconstitutionally vague
129
because they fail to define explicitly what conduct is unlawful. Both
126

See Charles Kunich, The Naked Clone, 91 KY. L.J. 1. 30-61 (2002); see also
Robertson, supra note 95, at 1399.
127
See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Is There A Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges To
Bans On Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643 (1998); George J. Annas, Human
Cloning: A Choice or an Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247 (1998); Ronald Chester, To
Be, Be, Be . . . Not Just to Be: Legal and Social Implications of Cloning for Human
Reproduction, 49 FLA. L. REV. 303 (1997); Daniel Mark Cohen, Cloning and the
Constitution, Cloning and the Constitution, Cloning and the Constitution, Cloning and . . .,
26 NOVA L. REV. 511 (2002); Debra Feuerberg Duffy, To Be or Not to Be: The Legal
Ramifications of the Cloning of Human Embryos, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189
(1995); Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42
ARIZ. L. REV. 647 (2000); Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 469 (1998); Michael I. Kahn, Clowning Around With Clones: The Moral
and Legal Implications of Human Cloning, 3 U.S.F. J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 161 (1999);
Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The Constitutionality of a Federal Ban on
Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 277 (1998); Robertson, supra note 95; Susan Tall, Legal and Ethical
Implications of Human Procreative Cloning, 3 U.S.F. J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 25 (1999).
128
See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 127, at 661-76 (analyzing whether cloning bans
are unconstitutionally vague, infringe upon a constitutional right of scientific
inquiry, or infringe upon the right to make reproductive decisions); Cohen, supra
note 127, at 527-42 (discussing cloning as it relates to reproductive freedom,
principles of Equal Protection, and freedom of speech); Foley, supra note 127, at 677709 (discussing cloning bans and the First Amendment right of scientific inquiry, the
Due Process Clause procreational liberty interest, and the Equal Protection Clause).
129
A third challenge that I initially considered viable, but ultimately dismissed, is
the assertion that a federal ban on cloning would exceed the federal government’s
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of these arguments are worthy of exploration as each proceeds from a
well-established body of constitutional jurisprudence. Yet, the unique
aspects of cloning will undoubtedly influence the analogies and
distinctions to existing practices that traditionally guide our courts’
legal reasoning.
1. Does a Cloning Ban Violate Protected Procreational
Liberty?
A total ban on human reproductive cloning would outlaw a
method by which children are conceived, an unprecedented action
130
in American jurisprudence. Over the past century, our courts have
produced a rich and evolving body of law wrestling with cases in
which governmental bodies have sought to regulate the conduct
131
surrounding conception, gestation, and childbirth.
On balance,
this body of law has displayed deference to each individuals right to
make highly personal decisions regarding conception and
132
childbirth.
In the oft-cited quote from Justice Brennan, we are
assured that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
133
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Whether
cloning would enjoy the protections of this and other established
rights is now unknown, but has been the subject of much academic

authority to regulate the practice of medicine. The argument begins with the
assertion that cloning is strictly a medical practice, the regulation of which is
traditionally left to individual states. See State of Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d
1077 (D. Or. 2002). I confess that even this prong of the argument is unlikely to
hold up, given the groundswell of repugnance surrounding the technique. Even if
cloning is viewed as a medical practice governed by state standards, it seems wellsettled that national enactments may specify and clearly define what is lawful and
what is not. Id. at 1092. Moreover, Congress’ authority to regulate, and even ban,
human reproductive cloning can likely be found in the Commerce Clause, which
gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1. As Professor Lori Andrews points out, there are numerous cases suggesting that
the activities surrounding cloning would be considered to have a substantial impact
on interstate commerce. From the ordering of supplies to the luring of individuals
from across state borders, any individual or facility that offered reproductive cloning
could hardly remain an intrastate operator. See Andrews, supra note 127, at 670-76.
130
The introduction of artificial insemination in the 1950s did bring calls for
criminalization of this new technology, but ultimately no prohibitory statutes were
enacted. See Daar, supra note 57, at 171 (discussing the history of AID in the United
States and abroad).
131
See infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
132
Id.
133
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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134

speculation.
In order to understand the protections accorded the right to
procreational autonomy, we must begin with the text of the U.S.
Constitution. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit, respectively, federal or state governments
from depriving any individual of “life, liberty, or property without
135
due process of law.”
This constitutional language has been
interpreted to contain a substantive component, meaning that the
government must provide sufficient justification for taking away an
136
individual’s life, liberty, or property.
The level of judicial scrutiny
accorded the government’s proferred justification depends upon the
nature of the rights involved. Courts will apply strict scrutiny to
137
evaluate the infringement.
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the
government will satisfy substantive due process only if it can prove
138
that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling state purpose.
The inception of the substantive liberty interest and its
protection of the right to procreate can be traced to the 1942
139
decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.
In Skinner, the Court invalidated
the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which allowed

134

See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 127, at 666 (arguing cloning is too qualitatively
different from normal reproduction to assume that the same Constitutional
protections would apply); Foley, supra note 100, at 700-04 (concluding that cloning is
a form of reproduction deserving the same protections as other forms of
reproduction); Robertson, supra note 127, at 1391 (arguing that some forms of
cloning show aspects of reproduction deserving of procreative liberty protection).
135
U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
136
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(stating that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “has been
understood to contain a substantive component as well, one ‘barring certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them’”).
137
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that “[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,
[thus] strict scrutiny is essential” when examining laws that seek to infringe on these
rights).
138
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
419-20 (1997) (discussing the history and meaning of substantive due process).
139
316 U.S. 535 (1942). An earlier case, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
first established that the liberty interest protected by the Constitution encompassed
more than the right to be free from physical restraint. The Court stated that the
liberty interest of the Due Process Clause “denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring
up children . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Id. at 399. While
Meyer implies a positive right of procreation, it is the later Skinner case that fully
establishes the link between the Due Process liberty interest and the right to
procreate.
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courts to order the sterilization of individuals convicted two or more
140
times for felonies involving “moral turpitude.”
Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas described the right to have offspring as “one
141
“Marriage and procreation,” one
of the basic civil rights of man.”
Justice explained, “are fundamental to the very existence and survival
142
of the race.”
One who is deprived by the state of the right to
143
reproduce “is forever deprived of a basic liberty.” The holding and
language in the decision indicate the Court’s designation of
procreation as a fundamental right, deserving of protection against
governmental restriction unless compelling reasons for interference
144
can be shown.
Following Skinner, the jurisprudence surrounding procreation
largely focused on state interference with the individual’s right to
145
avoid procreation, either through the use of contraceptives, or by
146
access to abortion. Though the cases addressed the specific rights
of individuals to avoid procreation, the Supreme Court often spoke
more broadly about the protections accorded reproduction as a
147
positive right in our society. As noted above, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a
case invalidating a law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried individuals, Justice Brennan reminded us of the
importance of procreation. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
spoke of the decision whether “to bear or beget a child” as a

140

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
Id. at 541.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
The Court in Skinner based its holding on the Equal Protection Clause, finding
that the Oklahoma law forced sterilization upon certain habitual felons convicted of
crimes of moral turpitude, while other habitual felons were untouched by the law.
But the broad language regarding the right to procreate has been interpreted to
mean that the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right
“to have children.” See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535).
145
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the use and distribution of contraceptives);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that
prohibited distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a New York
law that made it a crime to sell or distribute contraceptives to minors under sixteen
years of age).
146
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring that the Constitution
protects a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy prior to fetal
viability); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming the essential holding in Roe that the
government may not ban abortions before viability, but may regulate abortion so
long as it does not place an “undue burden” on access to abortions).
147
See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
141
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protected right under the constitutional right to privacy. A quarter
century later, the Court reiterated its view that procreation is a
fundamental right. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court cited
Skinner for the proposition that the “liberty” interest protected by the
149
Due Process Clause includes the right “to have children.”
Thus,
whether grounded in a right of privacy or the liberty interest
expressly contained in the Constitution, the idea is widely accepted
that traditional coital reproduction is protected against governmental
interference unless the state can show compelling reasons for
150
imposing restrictions.
It is essential to consider that the above-described body of law
dealing with procreational liberty and reproductive choice has arisen
in the context of traditional conception through sexual intercourse.
Whether these principles can be applied to noncoital forms of
reproduction, including cloning, is the subject of intense debate and
discussion.
For several years now, commentators have waxed
eloquent about the applicability of a long-established procreative
rights jurisprudence to newly emerging reproductive technologies
that were virtually unknown when the relevant legal principles were
being developed. In the case of reproductive cloning, powerful
arguments have been made both advocating and decrying the
application of traditional, protective principles to this controversial
151
form of reproduction.
On the one hand, some argue that cloning is a form of
reproduction deserving of constitutional protection equal to that
152
accorded other methods of childbearing. This argument assumes,
of course, that other forms of non-traditional reproduction, such as
in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination, receive the same
substantive due process protections accorded coital reproduction.
To date, courts have discussed this issue minimally, but there are
scattered indications that courts would view certain forms of assisted
153
reproduction on equal footing with traditional reproduction.
148

California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 453 (1971).
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535).
150
For a general discussion of the moral and legal arguments for procreative
liberty, see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22-42 (1994).
151
See supra note 134.
152
Robertson, supra note 95, at 1389-1403.
153
The most direct indication of such parity can be found in Lifchez v. Hartigan,
735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d mem., 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the
district court held that the right to make procreative decisions encompasses the right
of an infertile couple to undergo medically-assisted reproduction, including in vitro
fertilization and the use of a donated embryo. In plain and direct language, the
149

2003

THE PROSPECT OF HUMAN CLONING

547

Professor John Robertson has written extensively about the moral and
legal underpinnings for including certain forms of assisted
154
reproduction within the bounds of procreative liberty. In the case
of cloning, he argues that if current forms of assisted reproduction
fall within prevailing notions of procreative freedom, “then a strong
argument exists that some forms of cloning share certain aspects of
procreative liberty as well, for cloning shares many features with
155
assisted reproduction and genetic selection.”
Under Robertson’s view, the forms of cloning that should be
accorded procreative liberty protections are those in which an
individual has a gestational or biological relationship to the cloned
156
In the normal
child, coupled with an intent to rear that child.
course, constitutional protections have vested in those who either
157
158
bear (gestate) —or beget (produce) —a child, that is, to those who
are traditionally considered the mother and father of the child. In
the case of cloning, the “bearer” would be the gestational carrier of
159
the cloned embryo and the “begetter” would be the DNA donor.
Essentially, Robertson makes the argument that these individuals
would not necessarily be entitled to constitutional protection if they
160
lacked the intent to rear the resulting child.
He argues, “[a]ny
right to clone by persons who do not intend to rear would have to
161
derive from the right of those who end up rearing.” The reason for
this somewhat restrictive view, Robertson explains, is to anticipate
and squarely address the oft-expressed concern that cloning will
disaggregate the reproductive and rearing processes, leaving children
162
the victims of adult grandiosity and ambition.
According
procreative liberty protection to those who engage in cloning without
the intent to rear, Robertson warns, “seems to treat children like
court explained, “It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of
constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have access to
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a
medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.” Id. at
1377.
154
See Robertson, supra note 95.
155
Id. at 1391. The most notable similarities include the enabling of married
couples to have healthy, biologically related children for rearing, or allowing a
couple to obtain a source of tissue for transplant to an ailing child. Id.
156
Id. at 1395-1404.
157
Bear is defined as “to give birth to.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 75 (1974).
158
Beget is defined as “to become the father of.” Id. at 77.
159
For a fuller discussion of the constitutional protections afforded gestational
and biological parents, see Foley, supra note 127, at 700-02 (2000).
160
Id. at 1398-99.
161
Robertson, supra note 95, at 1399.
162
Id.
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fungible commodities produced for profit without regard to their
well-being. It should not be deemed part of the initiating couple’s
163
procreative liberty.”
Professor Elizabeth Price Foley expresses a broader view of the
parity between cloning and other assisted reproductive technologies.
Simply put, Foley posits that “[b]ecause cloning is merely an asexual
form of procreation, it is arguably as much a fundamental
constitutional right as our right to procreate by either passion or the
164
petri dish.” In a recent article, Foley critiques Robertson’s view that
procreational liberty should lie only where the gestational or
165
biological actors possess an intent to rear the resulting child. Foley
draws an analogy to traditional adoption scenarios where the
pregnant woman and biological father agree to surrender the child
166
upon birth.
Such a decision would not then terminate the
procreational liberty of either the gestating “bearer” or the
167
genetically-related “begetter.” For example, if the woman chose to
terminate her pregnancy, she could exercise that reproductive liberty
within the bounds of prevailing state law. Foley argues that just as
intent is irrelevant to the application of reproductive freedoms in
coital conception, neither should it play a role in according rights
168
when cloning techniques are used to conceive a child. In poignant
language, she argues that “unless we are prepared to institute ‘mind
police’ to enforce the appropriate moral or ethical standards for
conceiving a child, there is no place in the law of procreational
liberty for distinctions based upon the often inchoate and
169
questionable motivations of parents.”
The view that cloning is
simply an additional reproductive option in our growing arsenal of
assisted technologies is linked logically with the assertion that a ban
170
on cloning is a deprivation of reproductive liberty.
Yet even this
163

Id.
Foley, supra note 127, at 695.
165
Id. at 702.
166
Id. at 702-03.
167
Id. at 703.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 704.
170
A finding that a cloning ban is a deprivation of reproductive liberties would
not automatically invalidate such a law. Instead, the court would use strict scrutiny to
evaluate whether the government has a sufficiently compelling interest in stopping
the practice. As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky explains, “[u]nder strict scrutiny, a law
will be upheld if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. In other words,
the court must regard the government’s purpose as vital, as ‘compelling.’ Also, the
law must be shown to be ‘necessary’ as a means to accomplishing the end. This
requires proof that the law is the least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative.”
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 416 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). When
164
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foundational point, that cloning is a form of reproduction, is highly
disputed. A prominent voice among those who find cloning
distinguishable from other ARTs is Professor Lori Andrews. She
argues that “cloning is too qualitatively different from normal
reproduction and from the types of assisted reproduction protected
by the . . . case [law] to simply assume that the same Constitutional
171
protections apply.” Cloning, she argues, “is not a process of genetic
mix, but of genetic duplication,” which is sufficiently different from
172
reproduction in which a unique genotype is formed. George Annas
joins Andrews in her views and warns that “[t]his change in kind in
the fundamental way in which humans can ‘reproduce’ represents
such a challenge to human dignity and the potential devaluation of
human life . . . that even the search for an analogy has come up
173
empty handed.”
Proponents of a ban on reproductive cloning will likely respond
to a constitutional challenge based on procreative liberty with the
assertion that cloning is distinguishable from other forms of
reproduction sufficient to justify its exclusion from the protected
realm of conduct that constitutes our reproductive freedom. Those
distinguishing characteristics might include the fact that cloning is an
asexual form of reproduction, meaning that it does not require the
174
sexual union of sperm and egg to begin the process of cell division.
All other known forms of reproduction, including currently
employed ARTs, such as artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization, are forms of sexual reproduction because they rely on
175
the joining of the egg and sperm.
Cloning may be further
distinguished because it results in a child whose genotype matches
that of an existing person. Other forms of reproduction result in a
strict scrutiny is applied, laws are generally declared unconstitutional. Id. Whether a
cloning ban would warrant and then survive strict scrutiny remains to be seen, but at
least one scholar speculates on the various state interests that would be raised in a
cloning ban challenge. See Foley, supra note 127, at 709-30 (including the
preservation of the traditional family, the protection of personal autonomy and
privacy, the preservation of the sanctity of human life, the protection of the health
and safety of human embryos, and the preservation of human genetic diversity).
171
Andrews, supra note 127, at 666.
172
Id.
173
Scientific Discoveries in Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Public Health and Safety of the Senate Comm. On Labor and Human Resources,
105th Cong. 44 (1997) (statement of George Annas), as cited in Andrews, supra note
127, at 666.
174
See Thomas W. Hilgers, The New Technologies of Birth and Death, in THE NEW
TECHNOLOGIES OF BIRTH AND DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS 29, 4647 (1980).
175
See Foley, supra note 127, at 652 n.29.
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mixed, unique genotype. Perhaps cloning will be separated out
because it is the only known form of reproduction that does not
require the involvement of a male. Perhaps for these and other
reasons, those who would exclude cloning from the ambit of
protected reproductive freedoms are making an implicit assertion
that the “differentness” of cloning is normatively a negative quality.
I have previously observed that the initial overwhelmingly
negative reactions to cloning are reminiscent of furors that encircled
176
prior advances in reproductive medicine.
Two modalities in
particular, artificial insemination by donor (AID) and in vitro
fertilization (IVF), faced intense public skepticism and anxiety when
first introduced. Like their successor cloning technology, AID and
IVF stirred up dire warnings about the victimization of children and
the doomed fate of mankind should such unnatural methods of
177
reproduction be embraced.
When AID was introduced in the
178
1950s, critics called it “nothing more than mechanical adultery”
179
injurious to the essential nature and structure of the family.
The
introduction of IVF in the 1970s was likewise condemned as immoral,
with one scholar proposing that “technological reproduction” should
180
never be used to supplant human procreation.
Today both
methods of noncoital reproduction enjoy considerable favor,
combining to account for the birth of over 60,000 children
181
annually.
Whether cloning will achieve the technical and social successes
now enjoyed by once-condemned reproductive technologies remains
to be seen, but one similarity is already apparent. Cloning is, at its
very core, a method of human reproduction. To reproduce, or

176

See Daar, supra note 57, at 171.
See id. at 169-82.
178
The history of AID, which actually dates back to the late 1800s, is described in
Daar, supra note 57, at 169-70.
179
See Alberty R. Jonsen, Reproduction and Rationality, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 263 (1995).
180
See Paul Ramsey, Shall We Reproduce”?, 220 JAMA 1346 (1972).
181
See Machelle M. Seibel, Therapeutic Donor Insemination, in FAMILY BUILDING
THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION 34 (Machelle M. Seibel & Susan L. Crockin
eds.,1996) (reporting AID accounts for nearly 30,000 births annually); see also Society
for Assisted Reproductive Technology and the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States: 1998 Results Generated
From the American Society for Reproductive Medicine/ Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology Registry, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 18 (2002) (reporting the birth of 29,128
neonates through the use of IVF and other similar reproductive technologies). In
fact, the number of children born worldwide through IVF is much higher because
the ASRM statistics only include clinics in the United States.
177
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182

“produce again or anew” is, and will remain, a mystery of the
human condition, with the vast majority opting for the method of
least resistance. Common sense dictates that the leading choice for
reproduction will be the old-fashioned way, followed in turn by
methods that involve the least time, money, and effort. Cloning may
soon join the rank of available reproductive technologies, but it will
be a rare couple or individual who opts for what will undoubtedly be
a highly expensive, initially highly experimental treatment. Cloning
will serve as a treatment of last resort when all other therapies have
failed or cannot guard against heritable genetic defects. And for
those individuals who turn to cloning to replace a lost child, let us
remember that in the end, cloning produces a child. One’s capacity
to love and cherish that child will be no more affected by genotype
than it is by the many other qualities that the child brings to life.
From a procreative liberty perspective, once cloning is proven
safe and effective, there seems to be no compelling reason to exclude
this process from the ranks of other forms of protected reproductive
activities. Couples and individuals who seek out cloning will be a rare
breed, many of whom will have suffered the pain of intractable
infertility or worse, the loss of a child. To deny these individuals, or
even individuals who choose to reproduce through cloning for
reasons that appear idiosyncratic but are deeply rooted, can only
serve to empower the government to make lifestyle choices for society
that today seem beyond the realm of contemplation. Deprivation of
the right to reproduce in a manner one chooses strikes at the heart of
the liberty interest.
2. Is a Total Ban On Human Cloning Unconstitutionally
Vague?
A federal or state statute that bans human cloning may be
subject to challenge as unconstitutionally vague. A law that is vague,
especially but not exclusively a criminal law, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in three ways. First, a vague
183
law fails to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct.
Without
such notice, it is impossible for individuals to regulate their conduct
184
within legal bounds.
Courts often summarize this prong of the
182

“Reproduce” is defined as “to produce again anew . . . or . . . to bear
offspring.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1140 (1986).
183
Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d mem., 914
F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.8 (1974)).
184
Id. Due Process guarantees individuals the right to fair notice of whether their
conduct is prohibited by law. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91, 399 (1979)
(citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). Although only
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vagueness standard by admonishing that “a statute is void for
vagueness if persons of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess
185
at its meaning.’”
Second, vague statutes invite arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement by police, judges, and juries. Because a
vague law fails to define explicitly what conduct is unlawful, its
enforcers and interpreters may pursue their personal predilections in
186
finding a violation, rather than adhering to an objective standard.
Third, vague standards of unlawful conduct inevitably cause people
to overestimate the range of prohibited conduct, thus inhibiting
187
lawful, and even constitutionally protected, conduct.
A statutory ban on cloning may be challenged as impermissibly
vague by those individuals whose conduct would be affected or
proscribed by the statute.
Potential plaintiffs might include
researchers, physicians, or even patients who may fall within the
188
parameters of the statutory language.
A court’s review of any
vagueness challenge will inevitably require close review of the
statutory language, and in some instances may include reference to
189
the legislative history surrounding the enactment.
A law which
imposes civil penalties for the proscribed conduct may be found
190
unconstitutionally vague.
In the case of a criminal statute,
191
vagueness review is even more exacting than in the civil context.
constructive rather than actual notice is required, individuals must be given a
reasonable opportunity to discern whether their conduct is proscribed so they can
choose whether or not to comply with the law. Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009,
1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966)).
185
Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 1983).
186
Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (commenting that
statutory language of “standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries
to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their
responsibilities for setting the standard of the criminal law”)).
187
Id. (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 391) (holding unconstitutionally vague an
abortion law requiring persons performing abortions to preserve life of fetus if it
could be determined that the fetus “is viable or if there is sufficient reason to believe
that the fetus may be viable . . . .”).
188
For example, in Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2000) plaintiff
patients challenged an Arizona abortion law which they contended preventing them
from obtaining fetal tissue transplantation, considered by some a life-saving medical
treatment for Parkinson’s Disease.
189
See, e.g., Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (quoting
extensively from the legislative history surrounding the Illinois Abortion Law in a
vagueness challenge by a class of physicians).
190
For example, in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., the
Court analyized a law that imposed only a fine between $10 and $500. 455 U.S. 489,
492. The Court, however, determined that this law survived a challenge because it
did not unreasonably limit protected conduct. Id. at 495.
191
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that penal statutes
must define criminal offenses with “sufficient definiteness,” and “in a manner that
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To date, seven states have enacted statutory cloning bans,
192
193
194
195
including: Arkansas,
California,
Louisiana,
Michigan,
196
197
198
All six statutes provide
Missouri, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
civil penalties for engaging in human cloning, ranging in severity
199
from $50,000 “for each incident,” to $10,000,000 for any attempt to
200
In addition, the state of Louisiana
engage in human cloning.
imposes criminal penalties on any person who “clone[s] or
201
attempt[s] to clone a human being.”
The crime of cloning in
Louisiana is punishable by civil fine of not more than ten million
202
dollars; imprisonment, for not more than ten years; or both.
Because Louisiana is the only state currently imposing criminal
penalties for cloning activities, it may be instructive to evaluate the
203
viability of a vagueness challenge to Louisiana’s cloning ban.
As a threshold inquiry, a wide range of plaintiffs may have
standing to challenge Louisiana’s cloning ban on vagueness grounds.
The statute provides that “[n]o person shall clone or attempt to clone
204
a human being.”
Under the statute, a “person” include a
researcher who develops a cloning technique, a physician who
employs such technique on behalf of a patient, and even the patient
who consents to participate in the cloning activities by providing the
somatic cell to be used for transfer. A person who initiates the
cloning process by enlisting the services of one or more skilled
clonists may under the broad statutory language have attempted to
clone a human being. Read liberally, an “attempt” under the statute
may not require the medical know-how to actually achieve the desired
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) (holding that where a statute imposes criminal
penalties, the standard of certainty involved in vagueness review is higher).
192
S. 185, 2003 Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003).
193
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West 2002).
194
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.36.2 (West 2002).
195
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16274 (West 2002).
196
MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.217 (West 2002) (providing that “no state funds shall be
used for research with respect to the cloning of a human person”).
197
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-1 (2002).
198
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22 (2002).
199
Id. at § 32.1-162.22(C).
200
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16275(3) (West 2002); see also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 1299.36.2(D) (West 2002).
201
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.36.2(D) (West 2002).
202
Id.
203
The newly enacted Arkansas statute, which was signed into law on March 24,
2003, makes human cloning a crime, but does note enumerate any specific criminal
penalties.
204
Id. at § 1299.36.2(A).
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results, but simply the intent to bring about the birth of a child via
cloning.
The terms used to describe the prohibited conduct may also
present a vagueness concern. The relevant portions of the law
provide:
A. No person shall clone or attempt to clone a human being.
B. No person shall purchase or sell an ovum, zygote, embryo, or
fetus with the intent to clone a human being.
C. This Section does not prohibit scientific research or a cell
205
based therapy not specifically prohibited elsewhere by this Part.

The definition of cloning set forth in the statute also raises further
vagueness questions:
As used in this Part, “clone” means the practice of creating or
attempting to create a human being by transferring the nucleus
from a human cell from whatever source into a human egg cell
from which the nucleus has been removed for the purpose of or
to implant the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy that could
206
result in the birth of a human being.

Read together, these sections of the Louisiana cloning ban are
arguably both underinclusive and overinclusive in their descriptions
of prohibited conduct, thus leaving “persons of common intelligence
207
. . . forced to guess as to whether or not their conduct is unlawful.”
The described conduct is underinclusive because it does not
encompass all of the methods through which human cloning may be
achieved. The statute defines cloning as “transferring the nucleus
from a human cell . . . into a human egg from which the nucleus has
208
been removed . . . .”
Two scenarios currently under development
would clearly fall outside of this definition. First, researchers have
209
achieved promising results using cow eggs as hosts for human DNA.
A researcher who transfers the nucleus from a human cell into a cow
egg cell in this manner would not be guilty under the statute, even
though her intent would be to create a child using SCNT. Second,
researchers in China have been experimenting with a technique that
adds the somatic cell nucleus into an egg from which the nucleus has
not been removed. Preliminary results show that removing the
original nucleus after the somatic cell nucleus has been inserted is a
205

Id. at § 1299.36.2.
Id. at § 1299.36.1.
207
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
208
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.36.1 (West 2002).
209
See Korean Scientists Clone Human Embryo Using Cow Eggs, THE KOREAN HERALD,
Mar. 9, 2002.
206
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superior technique that improves the early embryo’s chance of
210
survival.
Under the strict construction required of a criminal
statute, researchers adopting the Chinese method of cloning may
reasonably believe that their conduct is not unlawful because the law
prohibits only the transfer of a nucleus to an enucleated cell.
Although a survey of Louisiana legislators might reveal that the law
was intended to cover the Chinese method, the effect of the statute’s
211
underinclusive language cannot be denied.
Perhaps a graver infirmity of the Louisiana cloning ban is its
potential to inhibit lawful conduct by failing to define clearly
“scientific research or a cell based therapy,” activities which are
exempt under the act. The failure to define a referenced activity,
even one that is specifically exempt from prosecution, often renders a
212
statute overbroad and thus impermissibly vague.
For example, in
213
Forbes v. Napolitano, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of an
Arizona statute that criminalized any medical “experimentation” or
“investigation” involving fetal tissue from induced abortions, unless
necessary to perform a “routine pathological examination” or to
214
diagnose a maternal or fetal condition that prompted the abortion.
The plaintiffs in Forbes included physicians who wished to provide
fetal tissue transplantation to patients suffering from Parkinson’s
215
Disease. The court reviewed the language in the statute, noting the
dearth of definitions of key terms, including “experimentation,”

210

See Karby Leggett & Antonio Regalado, As West Mulls Ethics, China Forges Ahead
In Stem-Cell Research, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2002, at A1.
211
Louisiana is not the only state to draft an underinclusive cloning ban. The
California statute also defines cloning as the transfer of a nucleus from a human cell
“into a human egg from which the nucleus has been removed.” CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 24185(c) (West 2002). Michigan and Rhode Island use similar
language to define cloning. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16274(d) (West 2002);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2(b)(4) (2002). The Virginia statute creates some ambiguity
as the whether removing the original nucleus after the somatic cell nucleus is
transfered would be covered. In Virginia, cloning is defined the same as it is in
Louisiana and California, but the statute also includes a definition of “somatic cell
nuclear transfer” as “transferring the nucleus of a somatic cell of an existing or
deceased human into an oocyte from which the chromosomes are removed or
rendered inert.” VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.21. Using “are removed” may leave open
the possibility that the original chromosomes could be removed after the nucleus is
transferred. The broadest definition is provided by Missouri which defines cloning
as “the replication of a human person by taking a cell with genetic material and
cultivating such cell through the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages of
development into a new human person.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.217.
212
See Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
213
236 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2000).
214
Id. at 1010 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2303).
215
Id.
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“investigation,” and “routine,” and concluded that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague because it provided no guidance to
physicians as to what conduct would be prohibited and what would be
216
exempt. Without defining its terms, the statute exempted “routine
examination” of fetal tissue, while prohibiting “experimentation”
thereon, thus giving doctors inadequate notice as to what conduct
217
would be actionable. A doctor may undertake a procedure that she
views as routine, but the state might consider such a procedure illegal
under the statute.
Likewise, a physician may refrain from
undertaking a particular procedure for fear that he will be arrested
for engaging in experimentation. Statutes drafted in this manner
are, thus, under- and overinclusive and therefore unconstitutionally
vague.
Though the cloning statutes in general, and the Louisiana
statute in particular, are careful to define the key term of “cloning,”
several statutes are remiss in providing a definition of “scientific
218
219
research.” In addition to Louisiana, Michigan, and Virginia also
explicitly exempt scientific research but provide little guidance as to
220
One concern about the exemption of
what such conduct entails.
scientific research is that scientists may be inhibited from pursuing
cell-based experimentation for fear of prosecution or imposition of
civil fines. The exemption of “research” from the cloning bans is
designed to allow and perhaps even encourage therapeutic cloning, a
technique that does not result in the birth of a human being. In fact,
however, these statutes may have the effect of inhibiting rather than
encouraging the study of therapeutic cloning.
For example, if a researcher studies therapeutic cloning and
discovers that the cloned embryo produces viable stem cells only after
it is implanted in a woman’s uterus for some time period and then
removed, this form of scientific research would be prohibited in
Louisiana because such implantation “could result in the birth of a
human being.” While a researcher’s intent would not be the birth of
216

Id. at 1012-13.
Id. at 1013.
218
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16274(2) (2002 ).
219
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22(B) (exempting biomedical and agricultural
research or practices).
220
For example, the first part of Michigan’s ban reads: “A licensee or registrant
shall not engage in or attempt to engage in human cloning.” MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.16274(1). The exemption in the second part reads: “Subsection (1) does
not prohibit scientific research or cell-based therapies not specifically prohibited by
that subsection.” Id. at § 333.16274(2). Part one does not specifically ban any
research conduct, but to assume that researchers are free to experiment on cloning
would defeat the purpose of the statute.
217
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a child, the relevant conduct could subject the individual to
prosecution because the statute does not explicate a scienter
requirement. This suggests an anomalous result: conduct alone,
regardless of intent, could subject researchers to criminal liability.
Consequently, this would likely chill research that is explicitly
exempted by the statute.
A similar infirmity befell the Illinois abortion law in Lifchez v.
221
Hartigan. The statute provided in relevant part, “[n]o person shall
sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the fertilization of a
human ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is
therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced. . . . Nothing in subsection
222
(7) is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization.”
Physicians practicing in the area of reproductive medicine challenged
the law as unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define key
223
terms such as “experimentation” and “therapeutic.”
One of the
plaintiffs, Dr. Lifchez, argued that the absence of clear guidance from
the legislature as to the meaning of these significant terms left him
224
uncertain about the lawfulness of his work using IVF. Even though
the statute exempts “the performance of in vitro fertilization,” there
are several related techniques, such as embryo transfer and genetic
screening of IVF-derived embryos, that are not explicitly exempt
under the statute and might have subjected Dr. Lifchez and others to
225
liability. Moreover, Dr. Lifchez worried that if he tried to improve
upon current IVF techniques, even these subtle changes would be
226
undertaken “at his peril.” Any variation of the IVF technique may
be therapeutic to the woman trying to conceive, but it is decidedly
non-therapeutic to embryos that might be lost in the initial stages of
experimentation. Thus, even though the statute exempted IVF from
prosecution, it left uncertainty as to how the technique could be
undertaken.
221

735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d mem., 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 6(7) (1989).
223
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1363-64.
224
Id. at 1368-70.
225
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1367-69. Specifically, Dr. Lifchez argued and the court
agreed that IVF-related procedures such as embryo transfer from one woman’s
uterus into another woman’s uterus, and genetic testing of early embryos
accomplished by removing one cell from the eight-celled embryo, might be
considered “therapeutic for the woman trying to get pregnant and unnecessarily
risky for the developing embryo.” Id. at 1368. If these procedures are seen as nontherapeutic to the embryo they could subject physicians to criminal liability even
though they “could fall within the statute’s in vitro exception.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
226
Id. at 1369.
222
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The Lifchez court agreed that the failure to define key terms
rendered the statute impermissibly vague because it subjected
physicians to uncertainty and possible criminal liability for engaging
227
in seemingly protected conduct. As noted above, experimentation
with therapeutic cloning may obtain a similar result. The exemption
for “scientific research or cell-based therapies” in several states’
cloning bans may present vagueness problems because the statutes
fail to explain the meaning of any of these key terms. Researchers
who clone embryos for the purpose of scientific inquiry may find
their futures uncertain if their conduct appears to creep toward
reproduction, even if their intent lies firmly in purely therapeutic
territory. This uncertainty has traditionally formed the basis for
declaring a law unconstitutionally vague and no compelling reason
emerges to deny cloning bans equal treatment under the law.
Although the current state bans on human cloning seem ripe for
constitutional challenge, the chances that such challenges will be
upheld are admittedly slim. As to procreative liberty arguments,
courts are likely to find that cloning is not within the realm of
protected reproductive activities. Even if courts are willing to reach
that far, there are sufficiently compelling state interests in banning
the practice, at least until such time as issues of safety and efficacy are
satisfactorily resolved. As to vagueness concerns, courts may find
little or no ambiguity in the prohibitory language, particularly when
the statutes impose civil rather than criminal penalties. Thus, with
enacted cloning bans predicted to survive and grow in number, it is
unlikely that human cloning will not make its way to the shores of our
nation. The following section assesses the practical aspects of
banning a technology that is snowballing its way into the hearts and
minds of scientists worldwide.
C. Is a Ban on Human Cloning Practical?
Human cloning as a practical matter is probably best described
as a “genie out of the bottle” problem. Human curiosity will continue
to pursue a deeper understanding of human biology and scientists
will continue to seek mastery over human processes that at one time
seemed exclusively within nature’s domain. We need only reflect on
advances in the artificial heart, the field of organ transplantation and,
of course, the burgeoning world of ARTs to see that science
continues to overcome nature’s barriers in the name of human
longevity and well-being. Cloning stirs those same intellectual

227

Id. at 1376.
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curiosities, and in fact has done so for much of the last century.
Experimentation in the field of animal cloning dates back to the
228
1930s, when researchers attempted to clone a vertebrate. Cloning
efforts in the 1950s and 1960s focused on amphibia, and attempts at
229
cloning mammals began in the late 1970s. For cloning researchers,
the announcement of Dolly’s birth was less a surprise than a
confirmation that their collective efforts had yielded a tentative
answer—mammalian cloning is possible.
With this natural and long-standing inquiry into cloning, will a
ban stop all current and future attempts to clone a human being? If
not, what are the implications of enacting statewide, national, or even
global cloning bans? Bans on cloning can and do take a variety of
forms, from bans on any attempt to create a human embryo using
230
SCNT regardless of the intended use of such an embryo, to bans on
231
The
governmental funding of efforts to clone a human being.
practical effect of any additional ban may be minimal, as research
efforts are currently unfunded by the government and numerous
jurisdictions have stringent cloning bans in place. Yet we are keenly
aware that cloning research and experimentation is underway. To
understand this defiant conduct, it is useful to review the various
achievements that undergird the human cloning efforts.
1. Successes and Failures in Animal Cloning
It may be that Dolly was the first mammal successfully conceived
through cloning, but she is no longer alone in her class. Recent
reports indicate that scientists have succeeded in cloning rabbits,
cattle, goats, mice, pigs, and cats, bringing the current total to seven
232
animal species. Progress in the cloning of multiple animal species
may seem a logical and necessary step in the march toward human
cloning, but the results and reactions to animal cloning have stirred
rather than quelled concerns over the prospect of human cloning. In
the six years since the announcement of Dolly’s birth, reports on the
safety and efficacy of animal cloning have ranged from “the health of
233
clones is no different than non-clones” to “every clone is genetically
228

See Seidel, supra note 4, at 23.
See id. at 24-27.
230
Such a ban would prohibit both reproductive and therapeutic cloning as both
begin by enucleating a human egg and inserting the DNA from a donor cell.
231
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.217 (West 2002) (providing that “no state funds
shall be used for research with respect to the cloning of a human person”).
232
See Four Rabbits Cloned From Adult Cells, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at A4.
233
See Alan Colman, Comment & Analysis: Letters: Dolly, The Media Hog, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2002, at 17.
229
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234

and physically defective.”
Finding the reality amid these vastly
diverging reports is a challenge, one complicated by the fact that the
science continues to evolve daily.
The facts surrounding Dolly’s birth are now well-known. Dolly
235
was the only sheep to survive the 277 attempts at SCNT, which
called into question the efficiency of cloning as a method of
236
In January 2002, it was reported that Dolly suffers
reproduction.
from arthritis, a condition that is thought to be unusual for a sheep
237
in her age group.
Moreover, recent retrospective reports list
defects occurring regularly in cloned animals, including gigantism
(excessive size) in cloned sheep and cattle, placentas up to four times
238
the normal size in mice, and heart defects in pigs. Researchers at
the University of Cincinnati reported that cloned mice became obese
after three weeks and grew to nearly three times larger than normal
239
mice as they aged.
Other experiments with cloned mice found
damaged immune systems, spontaneous abortions, abnormal births,
240
and premature deaths.
Researchers who report these clinical findings on cloned
animals are generally unsure why these defects occur. One theory

234

See Jonathan Leake, All Clones Defective, Says Dolly Creator, THE AUSTRALIAN, Apr.
29, 2002, at 3.
235
See Wilmut et al., supra note 1. Specifically, Dr. Wilmut and his colleagues
reported the successful fusion between adult mammary gland nuclei and enucleated
oocytes to the blastocyst stage in 29 out of 277 attempts (eleven percent), and only 1
of 29 (three percent) blastocysts transferred and developed into a live lamb. Id.
236
Recent reports suggest that the success rate in cloning animals is between one
to five percent, meaning that up to ninety-nine percent of cloned animals do not
survive birth. See Michele Grygotis, Researchers Find Cloned Mice Prone to Obesity in
Adulthood, Have Shortened Lifespans, Genetic Engineering Research, 12 TRANSPLANT NEWS,
Mar. 31, 2001. Other researchers report much higher overall survival rates. For
example, animal researchers at the University of Georgia Athens report that 14.3% of
cloned bovine embryos developed into healthy, normal animals. See Rebecca
McCarthy, UGA Clones Calf From Dead Animal, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 26, 2002, at
1A. As a measure of perspective, these figures can be compared to estimates of the
number of human embryos that develop into live offspring. Two researchers
recently reported that “a conservative estimate is that at least two-thirds of the
products of oocyte and sperm fusion are in some way defective” meaning that the
embryos never implant or perish very early in development. Howard W. Jones &
Lucinda Veeck, What Is An Embryo?, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 658 ( 2002).
237
See Milestones In Cloning Research, THE SCOTSMAN, Apr. 11, 2002, at 8; see also
Leake, supra note 232, at 3.
238
Leake, supra note 232.
239
See Michele Grygotis, Researchers Find Cloned Mice Prone to Obesity in Adulthood,
Have Shortened Lifespans, Genetic Engineering Research, 12 TRANSPLANT NEWS, Mar. 31,
2001.
240
Id.
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holds that cloned animals have shortened telomeres, the bits of
genetic material at the tips of chromosomes that wear down each
242
time a cell divides.
Shorter than normal telomeres essentially
means that cells start out older and may die off sooner, possibly
243
translating into a shorter lifespan for the cloned animal.
Other
researchers speculate that cloning problems are due to inadequate or
inappropriate “reprogramming” of genes during the process of
244
injecting DNA into an enucleated egg. Still others believe that the
cloning process can turn any gene on or off at random with an
unpredictable and potentially devastating impact on the health of the
245
cloned animal.
Reports of the dangers of animal cloning share the media stage
with claims of success and progress in understanding and improving
the science of cloning. The sheer number of successfully cloned
species indicates the rapid progress of animal cloning research. To
date, researchers have successfully cloned seven animal species, most
246
recently cats and rabbits.
In December 2001, California-based
Genetic Savings & Clone teamed with researchers at Texas A & M
247
University to clone a cat, appropriately named “cc” for “copycat.”
248
A few months
By all accounts, cc remains a normal, healthy cat.
after cc’s birth, French researchers announced the birth of healthy
249
rabbit clones.
The rabbits had been born a year earlier, but
241

Id.
Id.
243
Id.
244
See Health Dangers of the Human Clones, DAILY MAIL, Apr. 29, 2002, at 33.
245
Id.
246
The seven species are sheep, rabbits, cattle, goats, mice, pigs, and cats. See Four
Rabbits Cloned From Adult Cells,WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at A4. In 2000 Oregon
researchers produced a rhesus monkey named Tetra by splitting early stage embryos
and then implanting the pieces into a host monkey. See Cloning Kerfuffle; The U.S.
President and the Pope Are Among the Many Who Condemn the Use of Embryos for Human
Cloning, LONDON FREE PRESS, Nov. 27, 2001, at A6. The process of embryo splitting
used to conceive Tetra is not the same as the process used in Dolly’s birth; embryo
splitting begins by creating an embryo using two genetic sources—one male and one
female. The cells or blastomeres of the early embryo are then separated and the
nucleus from each of these blastomeres is placed in an oocyte which then becomes
an embryo. This process produces a finite number of identical offspring, each
having the same genome as the original embryo. See Seidel, supra note 4, at 24-28.
Dolly, in contrast, is the genetic twin of the single sheep whose cell was used for the
somatic cell nuclear transfer. To date, researchers have been unable to produce a
monkey using somatic cell nuclear transfer.
247
See Cloning: Commercial Cloning of Pets Two Years Away, Company Said, GENOMICS
& GENETICS WKLY., Apr. 12, 2002, at 14.
248
See Ben Carlson, Our Clones Are In Perfect Health, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 21,
2002, at 20.
249
See David Brown, A Big Hop Forward: Rabbits Cloned; Research Promise Seen In
242
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researchers delayed announcing the births until the rabbits started to
250
In announcing the cloning achievement,
reproduce normally.
researchers assured the public that “the animals were mature and
251
their good health certain.”
In addition to claims of health for specific species, scientists have
reported on the overall good health of cloned animals. In a study
published in the prestigious journal Science, researchers compared
cloned cows to cows conceived through artificial insemination and
252
found no difference in their health status.
In addition, a recent
survey of all cloned live-born animals concluded that the majority
remains healthy. Moreover, the survey found that the health of the
natural offspring of cloned animals is no different from non-cloned
253
animal offspring.
Dolly herself became a mother in April 1998
when she gave birth to Bonnie, a lamb conceived “the old-fashioned
254
way” with a mountain ram named David. In 1999, Dolly gave birth
again, this time to triplets, and in 2000 she bore twins, with no
255
complications reported for any of these offspring.
Today, Dolly
joins roughly 5,000 other animals conceived through SCNT in the
256
past six years.
With the number of cloned animals poised to multiply in the
months and years ahead, legitimate queries are raised about animal
cloning and its effect on human cloning. Will success in the animal
arena give implied authorization for researchers to apply their fund
of knowledge to human reproduction? Or will scientists search for
more reliable assurances of the safety and efficacy of cloning as
applied to human beings? Though we have some knowledge about
the degree to which experiments and procedures on animals
translate to human outcomes, we will only know about the effects of
SCNT when the first embryo, fetus, and child is created. For some,
the leap from animal experiments to human conception is far too
grave a prospect to contemplate; for others, it is a necessary and
Second Lab Animal to be Replicated, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at A1.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
See William Hathaway, Study Finds Cloned Cows Like Any Others, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 24, 2001, at A5. Specifically, the researchers reported that they “did
not observe genetic defects, immune deficiencies, gross obesity, or other drastic
abnormalities cited by other researchers.” Id.
253
See Colman, supra note 231, at 17.
254
See Michael Seamark, A Natural-Born Beauty As Dolly Has A Little Lamb, DAILY
MAIL, Apr. 24, 1998, at 17.
255
See Jill Stevenson, The Six Years Which Transformed Medicine, THE SCOTSMAN, Jan.
5, 2002, at 3.
256
Id.
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inevitable step in the advancement and development of humankind.
To date, there have been few if any calls for banning
257
reproductive cloning in animals.
The merits and rationales for
continuing to perfect the science of cloning in animals seem
markedly different from those associated with human cloning.
Reproductive cloning of the human species has been linked to
narcissism and nefarious desires to engineer our children “to custom
258
specifications.” But when performed on animals, cloning is seen as
259
The benefits of animal cloning include the
beneficial to humans.
260
production of superior cattle for meat consumption,
the
261
revivification of a lost pet for lifetime companionship, and the
262
With these
creation of animals for use in medical research.
significant benefits to mankind, it seems unlikely that efforts to learn
257

There have, however, been calls for banning the use of cloned animal
products, the impact of which would be to significantly reduce the interest in cloning
animals. See Hathaway, supra note 250, at A5.
258
See Judith F. Daar, Editorial, We Can Tackle Cloning Responsibly, L.A. TIMES, June
2, 2002, at B19 (quoting a speech delivered by President Bush on the dangers of
human cloning).
259
An interesting question arises as to the benefit, if any, that befalls the animal
who is cloned. Animals rights activists might very well argue that cloning is just as
harmful to animals as it is to humans because of the safety and efficacy problems that
have arisen, but such arguments do not seem to have stemmed the tide of increasing
cloning experimentation on animals. Another interesting development in the
animal world focuses on reviving extinct species using cloning. In May 2002
researchers announced plans to clone an extinct Tasmanian tiger. Declared extinct
in 1936, the tiger’s DNA has been successfully replicated using DNA from a
preserved pup specimen. See Researchers Announce Plans to Clone Extinct Tasmanian
Tiger, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, May 28, 2002. Query the human benefit to such an
attempt. The animal was hardly a beloved species; it was hunted as vermin for
attacking sheep, garnering a bounty for every carcass produced.
260
See Rebecca McCarthy, UGA Clones Calf from Dead Animal, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Apr. 26, 2002, at 1A (reporting that scientists believe cloning technology will allow
cattle farmers to stock herds with “cows capable of producing meat [with heritable
traits] such as tenderness and marbling”).
261
See Cloning: Commercial Cloning of Pets Two Years Away, Company Said, GENOMICS
& GENETICS WKLY., Apr. 12, 2002, at 14 (reporting on the Missyplicity Project, a $3.7
million effort to clone a mixed-breed pet dog named Missy).
262
See David Brown, A Big Hop Forward: Rabbits Cloned; Research Promise Seen In
Second Lab Animal to be Replicated, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at A1. Reporter Brown
explains the usefulness of rabbit cloning as follows:
Rabbits are used extensively in heart disease research. They also are
used to make monoclonal antibodies, which are immune-system
proteins used to diagnose and in some cases treat diseases. The rabbit
immune system resembles that of human beings. That has made the
species useful in studies of organ rejection after transplant. In
addition, much of the basic research on reproduction that led to
successful cloning was done on rabbits.
Id.
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more about cloning through animal studies will be halted.
Moreover, it seems equally unlikely that any ban on human
reproductive cloning will affect research in the animal kingdom. In
fact, the call for a human cloning ban may flow directly from the
ongoing progress in animal cloning. Those opposed to human
cloning because of safety and efficacy concerns may call for a
temporary ban until full-fledged results from animal studies can be
evaluated. Policy groups such as the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission and the National Academy of Sciences, which urged for
a temporary moratorium to be placed on reproductive cloning, seem
open to supporting the technique if they were convinced that
children born of the process would be as healthy as children born
from ordinary conception. For these groups and others like them,
animal cloning may be the gateway to human cloning. Banning
human cloning now may have the effect of accelerating research on
animal cloning so that a sufficient number of species can be
successfully cloned, including species closest to humans, to assuage
safety concerns. Thus, in the end, a ban on human cloning will not
thwart efforts to clone multiple animal species and may ultimately
enable the production of sufficient evidence to support moving
forward with cloning human beings.
2. Inroads In Human Cloning
The race to legislate national and even international bans on
human reproductive cloning can be evaluated in terms of its practical
effect on researchers and others anxious to garner a place in history
for being the first to clone a human being. Thus, the practical effects
of banning human cloning should be considered either before or at
the same time such bans are widely adopted. If bans will have no
effect in stopping attempts to clone a human being, what ancillary
effects will they have? If the net effect of such bans is negative or
even neutral, can they be justified in light of the false sense of
security they may invoke? Human nature is such that bans on
conduct can serve to incite curiosity, often leading to irresponsible
conduct. Should human cloning be the victim of such natural
instincts, we must seriously question the value of an outright ban.
As noted above, a number of U.S. states as well as numerous
263
countries have already banned human reproductive cloning.
Yet
efforts to clone a human being are ongoing in the United States and
abroad. One of the earliest to announce cloning aspirations was Dr.

263

See supra notes 20 & 33.
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Severino Antinori, an Italian fertility specialist who promised in
August 2001 that he would work to create the first cloned human
264
being.
In April 2002, Dr. Antinori surfaced again, this time amid
rumors that he is responsible for the first ongoing pregnancy using a
265
cloned embryo. The Gulf News, an English-language newspaper in
the United Arab Emirates, reported that Dr. Antinori announced at a
local conference that one woman in his fertility program was in the
266
early stages of a cloned pregnancy.
Later in the month, Dr.
Antinori claimed that he was aware of, but not responsible for, three
ongoing cloned pregnancies of babies in their ninth, seventh, and
267
sixth weeks of gestation.
Though the doctor claimed he was “not
268
implicated in any way,” he did reveal the country of origin of the
269
three women as two former Soviet states and one Islamic country.
He made this comment after remarking that China, India, Russia,
and the Muslim countries are more favorable to the idea of human
270
cloning than many other countries.
On December 26, 2002, it appeared that Dr. Antinori was
upstaged by a group known as Clonaid, which announced the birth of
271
the world’s first human clone.
The baby, nicknamed Eve, was
alleged to have been born outside the United States to American
272
Clonaid’s president, Brigitte Boisselier, offered no proof
parents.
that the birth had occurred, raising skepticism among the scientific
273
community.
Clonaid continues to announce the birth of cloned
274
babies, but to date has produced no evidence that such a task has
264

See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Despite Opposition,Three Vow to Pursue Cloning of Humans,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at A1.
265
See First Human Cloning Pregnancy Reported: Scientists Skeptical, TRANSPLANT NEWS,
Apr. 12, 2002.
266
Id.
267
See Graham Diggines, Doctor Says Women Are Carrying Clones, EDINBURGH
EVENING NEWS, Apr. 24, 2002, at 2. Other scientists doubt the reports of multiple
cloned pregnancies are true. See Human Clone Race to Deliver in 2003, MX, May 16,
2002, at 7.
268
Diggines, supra note 265, at 2.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Clonaid is a private company affiliated with the Raelian religious sect. Raelians
believe that space travelers created the human race by cloning. Among other things,
Raelians believe cloning is the path to eternal life, transferring memories and
consciousness from one copy to the next. See Dana Canedy & Kenneth Chang, Group
Says Human Clone Was Born to an American, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at A16.
272
Id.
273
See Gina Kolata, Experts Are Suspicious of Group’s Claim of Cloned Human’s Birth,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2002, at A16.
274
David Carr, Networks Say Former Editor Tried to Sell Clone “Exclusive”, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2003, at 14 (detailing Clonaid’s claims to have birthed two cloned babies).
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275

been accomplished. In an ironic twist, Dr. Antinori, the first doctor
to make claims that he would accomplish human cloning, dismissed
Clonaid’s claims, saying the group “has no credibility in the science
276
community.”
At the same time, Dr. Antinori maintains that a
consortium of scientists with whom he is affiliated has created at least
277
three pregnancies using cloning techniques. To date, no evidence
of any human clone has been presented to the scientific community
or to the public at large.
We may eventually learn whether the rumors and attributions
surrounding Clonaid and Dr. Antinori are in fact true if a healthy
baby is born and the child’s genome is verified as an identical match
to an existing person. Importantly, we may not learn the details
surrounding the birth of a cloned child if the infant suffers from any
serious health problems or dies in the neonatal period. Most
probably, no matter what the outcome of these alleged initial
pregnancies and births, inquiry into human cloning will continue.
Clonaid and Dr. Antinori may be the only researchers now willing to
air publicly their reproductive cloning efforts, but we can be sure that
other attempts are underway.
While no one in the United States has yet to claim a purposeful
advancement of the science of human reproductive cloning,
researchers at Advanced Cell Technologies (ACT), a biotechnology
company based in Worcester, Massachusetts, have announced success
278
at cloning human embryos.
According to ACT, the experiments
were conducted not for reproductive purposes, but to create a source
279
of stem cells for therapeutic purposes.
In November 2001, ACT
published a study in the peer-reviewed on-line journal E-biomed
detailing experiments with enucleated eggs and insertion of DNA
280
from a donor cell.
In the end, none of the eggs survived beyond
the blastocyst stage and the possible blastocysts that did develop
281
lacked the inner cell mass that yields stem cells.
Despite the
apparent lack of success in producing a viable human embryo, ACT’s
actions were condemned for what they portended about the
275

Id.
Italian Authorities Investigating Fertility Doctor Pursuing Human Clones, GENOMICS &
GENETICS WKLY., Feb. 14, 2003, at A15.
277
Id.
278
See Gina Kolata, Company Says It Produced Embryo Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001,
at A14.
279
See Gina Kolata with Andrew Pollack, A Breakthrough on Cloning? Perhaps, or
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282

possibility of human cloning in the future.
Nevertheless, ACT
vowed to continue its efforts to perfect human therapeutic cloning
“as a potentially limitless source of immune-compatible cells for tissue
283
engineering and transplantation medicine.”
In addition to the research efforts of American biotechnology
companies such as ACT, studies are underway in other countries that
certainly rival and perhaps surpass the work of U.S. scientists.
Scientists at Xiangya Medical College in China claim to have cloned
dozens of human embryos over the past two years for medical
284
research purposes.
These researchers are said to be one of two
teams of scientists in China currently working on embryo cloning
285
experiments. Initial accounts reveal that the Chinese scientists have
been able to grow a cloned embryo to the blastocyst stage, extract
stem cells from the inner cell mass of the blastocyst, and maintain the
286
stem cells in the laboratory for three generations. If this is the case,
these researchers have far exceeded the reported capabilities of U.S.
researchers. Although the Chinese researchers emphasize that their
work is aimed at therapeutic cloning, there is no scientific reason why
the techniques being perfected could not also be used in
reproductive cloning. In a recent interview, Dr. Lu Guangxiu, the
professor who heads the Xiangya team, was asked about the
possibility of human reproductive cloning. “It is,” she remarked, “an
287
irresistible trend.”
This “irresistible trend” intrigues researchers not only because of
its scientific newness, but also because of its potential for garnering
enormous research dollars. On the heels of Dr. Lu’s success, the
288
Chinese government increased her annual research grant.
In
addition, she was able to convince one of China’s largest companies,
China International Trust & Investment Corporation, to invest three
289
million dollars in the fertility clinic she runs.
Clearly, the
opportunity for profit has propelled many countries into the cloning
race.
Nations in Europe and Asia are creating regulatory
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environments friendly to therapeutic cloning to attract both
290
For example, lawmakers in
researchers and research funding.
Britain and Singapore recently revised their laws to allow stem cell
291
research using human embryos.
While the impetus for such
reforms is clearly profit-oriented, the byproduct of such development
will undoubtedly advance the science of human cloning. Once
scientists are adept at creating blastocysts using SCNT, the step
toward implanting a cloned embryo into a woman’s uterus is a
comparatively small measure.
The recent and prospective future attention on manipulation of
the human embryo for medical and research purposes has created a
race for greater understanding of the science of cloning. It is clear
that researchers in the United States and abroad will continue their
marathon efforts to clone human embryos, perhaps now for
therapeutic purposes, but with a keen awareness of the reproductive
possibilities lurking in the background. A ban in any particular U.S.
state will merely move operations across state lines; a ban in any
particular country will likewise make other nations more friendly to
the cloning community. As described earlier, cloning is a “genie out
of the bottle” phenomenon. Ongoing experimentation both here
and abroad is a predictable and natural response to an emerging
technology that beckons mankind to unravel the mystery of human
life.
3. The Effects of Banning Conduct
The inevitability of human reproductive cloning may be in the
minds of many scientists, but it is still perceived as a stoppable evil to
many lawmakers.
Thus, the march toward a total ban on
reproductive cloning continues, buoyed by the public’s revulsion to
292
the very idea of cloning and the thoughtful comments of several
293
prestigious panels that have recommended outlawing the practice.
If human reproductive cloning is banned in the United States, as it
has been in most of Europe, we must ascertain what effect those laws
will have on the practice of cloning. A ban in the United States and
Europe, or even a ban with more international scope, as has been
290

See Britain at Cutting-Edge of the Biotech Boom, THE BUSINESS, Apr. 7, 2002, at 13
(reporting on a vote by parliament in February 2002 to end the ban on stem cell
research with human embryos, including cloning); see also Chan Kay Min, Call for
Body to Check Stem Cell Studies, THE STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at 3 (describing
Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee’s proposal to regulate stem cell research).
291
Id.
292
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
293
See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.

2003

THE PROSPECT OF HUMAN CLONING

569

contemplated, seems unlikely to actually stop the science from being
developed and the technique employed.
The unprecedented step of banning a prospective scientific
technique will not prevent the technology from being developed, but
rather will negatively impact the way in which the development
occurs. Human nature is such that legislative bans do not always stop
prohibited conduct; in fact, in some cases a ban may create an
incentive for action. Certainly our criminal justice system is replete
with demonstrations of this principle. Banning or criminalizing
conduct has not made criminal acts extinct, and no doubt many a
prisoner has earned that status by purposefully defying known
prohibitions in the name of self-aggrandizement.
While the
comparison between criminal acts and scientific inquiry may be a
weak one, it nonetheless highlights the reality that when those in
power declare certain conduct to be off limits for its citizenry, rarely
if ever will such conduct cease in that society. Even threats and
demonstrations of severe penalties do not prevent displays of
294
unwanted conduct.
In the cloning context, if Congress enacts a total ban, we should
expect that ongoing efforts will move underground in the United
States and offshore to more cloning-friendly nations. Today, we are
aware of a very small pool of researchers working openly in the area
of embryo cloning, and all publicly state that their aims are strictly
295
therapeutic. But we are also aware of hints at secret research being
296
conducted on reproductive cloning. Those hints are coming from
places outside the United States, but we are not immune from
clandestine efforts at human cloning within our borders. Last
summer at a symposium sponsored by the National Academy of
Sciences, Dr. Brigitte Boisselier, a chemist with Clonaid, announced
297
that she had made progress toward human cloning.
Though Dr.
294
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Boisselier did not discuss the location of her research efforts, later
reports revealed that she had been operating in a laboratory in Nitro,
298
West Virginia.
The “laboratory,” as it turns out, was a single
classroom in the Nitro Community Center, a facility that also houses
299
a day care center and the Nitro Police Department. The laboratory
was shut down after agents of the Food and Drug Administration
300
began to investigate rumors of a cloning facility in Nitro.
What was perhaps most unsettling about Dr. Boisselier’s efforts
was that they were supported by Mark Hunt, a lawyer and member of
the state House of Delegates, who had paid the research group nearly
$500,000 to clone his 10-month old son who died after surgery for a
301
heart defect.
Mr. Hunt’s grief over the loss of his son made him
vulnerable to the promises of a single researcher, a researcher who
lacked the background and support to fulfill even the most modest
302
hopes of her sponsor.
In the end, Mr. Hunt severed his ties with
the cloning group because it was not making progress in the quest to
303
create an identical twin of his lost son. Mr. Hunt is not alone in his
private desire for the science of human cloning to come of age, nor is
he likely to be the only victim of unscrupulous “researchers” who will
continue to operate so long as they have a monopoly on those
individuals and groups who wish to provide financial support to
advance the cloning cause. Such “researchers” will thrive until they
are replaced by skilled professionals whose training and experience
truly holds the promise of safe and ethical progress in this difficult
area.
Another byproduct of a ban on scientific research would be a
“brain drain,” as talented and well-funded scientists leave the United
States to establish research centers in nations with hospitable working
environments. We have already begun to see this brain drain to a
304
small extent in the past year.
In 2001, University of California
researcher Roger Pedersen left his position at UC San Francisco to
305
accept a post at Cambridge University in Britain. At the time of Dr.
Pedersen’s move, Congress was debating the merits of banning all
298
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forms of cloning research, including both reproductive and
306
therapeutic techniques. At the same time, Britain was considering
ways to create opportunities for researchers to flourish in the field of
therapeutic cloning, seen as a biotechnology boon for all its promise
307
of new and innovative therapies.
When Dr. Pedersen made the
move from the United States to Britain, it was widely reported that
the impetus for his relocation was the differing state of the law in the
308
two nations.
Now, as Britain joins several other European and
Asian countries vying for the hefty biotech dollars thought to be
connected to therapeutic cloning and stem cell research, it is likely
that the brain drain will only accelerate if Congress succeeds in
309
banning all forms of cloning.
Banning conduct creates underground activities and banning
cloning undoubtedly will have this expected result. The few details
we have learned about Dr. Boisselier’s activities should be all the
warning we need. Her cloning experiments, whether actual or
threatened, would have taken place in a totally unsupervised,
unregulated environment. With underground cloning efforts, there
will be no reporting to oversight organizations that could assess the
safety, progress, or value of the experiments. There will be no peer
review of any findings that emerge from the research. There will be
no method to assure separation between the funding source for the
research and the results of the research. The opportunity for conflict
of interest among these unchecked researchers is tremendous, and
the probability that they will report false, perhaps even intentionally
falsified data, is high.
From a practical perspective, a ban on human cloning will only
encourage development of irresponsible and ill-conceived research
agendas. A ban may provide an initial period of solace and comfort,
but the curiosity surrounding cloning is too great to repress the
exuberance that will accompany any perceived progress in the field,
whether lawfully or unlawfully begotten. The United States and a
306
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number of other nations have long-standing research structures in
place that could accommodate a steady and responsible path toward
human reproductive cloning.
Working together in an open
environment, the best and the brightest scientists of our age could
advance our understanding of human development, an advance that
will once again remind us how much more is yet to be discovered.
IV. CONCLUSION
The prospect of human cloning poses the unanswerable query:
will it improve nature or doom the species? While the realities of a
cloning-laden future are unknowable, we seem to have prejudged
that future to be grim, besot with human misery by those who are the
products of cloning and human indifference for those who
reproduce in that fashion. Today’s efforts to ban human cloning are
emblematic of our own self-doubt, our fear that unraveling the
mysteries of human life can only lead to our undoing. Humanity has
always displayed this schizophrenic view of itself, on the one hand
pressing to know more about the world around us, while displaying
initial fear and hostility toward the very things we seek to discover.
Cloning is merely the latest discovery to evoke these instinctive and
legitimate reactions.
It is inevitable that advances in human cloning will far outpace
our ability to halt the practice in any meaningful sense. Statutory
bans, such as those in place in the United States, are of questionable
moral and legal status, but perhaps most importantly they are of little
practical effect. Rapid advances in animal cloning, coupled with
renegade efforts to inaugurate the human cloning process, assure the
viability of cloning as a future method of human reproduction.
Reasoned regulation, not breakable barriers, seems a far better way to
meet the challenges of a cloning future. Human cloning will only
doom our species if we fail to recognize the power it has to improve
the human condition. Harnessing that power is our challenge today
because what we build will shape our future tomorrow and always.

